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Abstract
Title of Dissertation

: “Study on the implications of autonomous ships on maritime
security and law enforcement by reviewing selected maritime
security incidents”

Degree

: Master of Science

MASS is the future of shipping. Technological advancement has taken humans to the moon and
space, which was earlier explored only by machines. However, the same technology has proved
that machines can replace human presence at sea, which is an advancement of the human race. The
world is widely accepting MASS, and it has proved to be the key to the future of sustainable
shipping. This giant leap in the shipping industry calls for bigger challenges for maritime security
as well.
In the context of a maritime security threat, including maritime terrorism, piracy, armed robbery
against ships, the IMO has formulated several regulations. Ships as a means of transport can easily
impact maritime security, good order, and peace at sea. There is a reasonable fear that a ship might
be transformed easily from a simple mode of transport to a weapon. The arrival in the maritime
world of autonomous vessels will also affect the spectrum of maritime security. In addition, this
ultra-technological change will have certain ramifications in the enforcement scheme too. The idea
of independent, unmanned ships disrupts the whole maritime regulatory scene and affects the
fundamental concepts of law.
This dissertation discusses the implications of MASS on maritime security and law enforcement
as the transition will witness bigger security challenges, the ship being totally unmanned. In line
with this, possible mitigation measures are also investigated. On autonomous crewless ships, the
threat factors are more cyber than on conventional ships, where physical attacks are more likely.
The focus on the mitigation measures that the law enforcement agencies and shipping industry
have to consider is the need of the hour. The implementation of the preventive measures requires
equal overhauling in infrastructure, coordination between agencies, and law enforcement
procedures. Thereupon, the dissertation discusses the need for applicable solutions for preventing
security threats.
Keywords: Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) Autonomous ships, Unmanned Ships,
Shore Control Centres (SCC), Maritime Security, ISPS, Piracy, Cyber-piracy, Armed robbery,
Stowaway, Transnational organised crimes, Drug Trafficking, Maritime law enforcement, VBSS
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
1.1

Background – MASS in the Maritime World

The maritime industry, including modern ships, are involved in the revolution denoted by the term
Industry 4.0, resulting in defining the new term 4.0 ship, describes the trend in maritime technology
towards increasing automation. It includes the internet of things (IoT), artificial intelligence (AI),
autonomous and unmanned technology (Im et al., 2018; Trump, 2020). Shipping 4.0 revolution
has introduced autonomous ships (AS) or maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS1), which
can be operated from a Shore Control Centre (SCC2) by an automated decision-making system
(Emad et al., 2020; Sakhi et al., 2019).
There are multiple rationale3 for the shipping industry to embrace AS (Chang et al., 2021).
However, there are concerns about whether the new technology will be accepted by the
governments and the conservative maritime industry as many legitimate issues exist about the
safety and security of its operation and reliability (UNCTAD, 2018). Although the maritime sector
is advancing technologically, 4.0 ships still lack robustness and resilience against many dangers,
including cyber or physical attacks (Trump, 2020).
Hazards, both traditional safety hazards, such as the possibility of collision or grounding and
security threats, including piracy, are ever-present at sea. Shipping and ship represent great
monetary and symbolic value and thus can be the target of the security threats such as robbery,
piracy or terrorist attack (Liwång, 2016). Maritime security has been a perpetual concern to all
involved in the maritime transport industry. Over the years, international organizations,
governments, shipowners, and operators have reinforced legal and administrative instruments and
procedures to maintain the highest security for ships, people, and cargo (Herbert-Burns et al.,
2019). Today, the challenge for AS is to establish a technological system that is sufficiently

1

Defined by the IMO as “ships which, to a varying degree, can operate independently of human interaction.”

2

A Shore Control Center (SCC) is a “Place from where an operator can monitor and remotely control unmanned
vessels” (Porathe, 2014).
3

Elimination of human errors, reducing operational cost, enhanced efficiency by allocating more space for cargo,
saving fuel and reducing emission.

1

capable of dealing with terrorist attacks and pirates (Sakhi et al., 2019). Also, MASS may change
the pattern of pirates, terrorists, criminal activities and introduce potential security risks (Table 1)
(Kim, M., Joung, Jeong, & Park, 2020a).
Table 1.Potential risks with MASS (Kim et al., 2020)

1.1.1 Defining MASS
The concept of e-navigation as a harmonised electronic automation system that integrates,
exchanges, and analyses marine information has provided a firm basis for unmanned and
autonomous maritime systems. Further, the development of satellite communication ensured
seamless interaction between shore and ships at sea, which enabled autonomous technology to be
implemented (Emad et al., 2020). AS means the ability of a ship to independently govern its
operations while transporting cargo from one location to another (Rødseth, Ø J. & Nordahl, 2017).
In comparison, MUNIN4 defined autonomous ship as a vessel with “Next-generation modular
control systems and communications technology that will enable wireless monitoring and control
functions both on and off the board. These will include advanced decision support systems to
provide a capability to operate ships remotely under semi or fully autonomous control” (figure 1)
(Munim, 2019, p.3). In 2017, the IMO adopted MASS to refer to future unmanned or fully
autonomous ships (Emad et al., 2020). According to various levels of autonomy, many alternative

4

Maritime Unmanned Ships through Intelligence in Networks
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names for autonomous ships, including crewless ships and MASS, were used (Rødseth & Nordahl,
2017).

Figure 1. Envisaged ship control methods (Şenol et al., 2017; MUNIN)
1.1.2 Level of Autonomy
The level of autonomy for autonomous ships is widely discussed and deliberated by various
agencies. Over six global authorities5 defined their category for the level of autonomy (Zhou et al.,
2019). Llyod’s register classification includes seven levels of autonomy6 (onboard decision
support to a fully autonomous). IMO adopted the autonomy levels (figure 2) suggested by the
Danish Maritime Authority (Zhou et al., 2021). For Regulatory Scoping Exercise (RSE), IMO has
established four degrees of autonomy (IMO, 2018). Degree 3-4/ level RU-A would not have
seafarers onboard, and vessels would be controlled remotely or fully autonomously with limited
or no direct human interactions (Klein, 2019; Şenol et al., 2017). The degree of autonomy is not

5

Lloyd’s Register, Norwegian Forum for Autonomous Ships, Danish Maritime Authority, Maritime Autonomous
Systems Regulatory Working Group, Bureau Veritas and IMO
6

AL0 ~ AL 6

3

essentially linear or hierarchical. MASS can work at one or more autonomous levels during a
single passage (Kim, T. & Mallam, 2020).

Figure 2. MASS – Taxonomy of autonomy level (Zhou et al., 2021)
1.1.3 Development timeline - MASS
The notion of autonomy is not new7, as the idea of autonomous “self-steered” robots has been
around since the advent of computers. With improvements in automation, smart ships have
grabbed attention (Kim, M., Joung, Jeong, & Park, 2020b; Zhou et al., 2021). The first significant
study on a crewless and autonomous merchant ship was carried out under EU flagship-project
MUNIN, which triggered a wave in Europe, and various companies rapidly launched other concept
ships (figure 3) (Rødseth, Ørnulf Jan et al., 2021; Wariishi, 2019). The MUNIN project concluded
that crewless and autonomous ships could and will be used when they are safer and cost-effective
(Felski & Zwolak, 2020; Rødseth, Ørnulf Jan, 2018). According to Szelangiewicz & Żelazny
(2020) initially, crewless ships are being employed for small-scale transport activity8. As

7

In 1898, Nikola Tesla patented “method of and apparatus for controlling mechanism of moving vessels” (Guerra,
2017)
8

Short distance car-passenger ferries, Port and technical vessels, Inspection and testing ships (hydrographic), Tugboats

4

technology improves and legal regulations develop, ocean-going AS will emerge (in 15-20 years)
(Szelangiewicz & Żelazny, 2020).

Figure 3. European initiatives in development of autonomous ships (Wariishi, 2019)
Leading companies have promised to deliver their crewless vessels by 2025 and envisaged that
fully autonomous ships would be operating by 2035 (figure 4) (Emad et al., 2020; UNCTAD,
2018).

Figure 4. Autonomous ship future development timeline (Emad et al., 2020)
1.2

IMO MASS Initiatives

In order to cover the advancing technologies by the international regulatory framework, IMO
embarked on a RSE in 2017 to “determine how safe, secure and environmentally sound MASS
operations might be addressed in IMO instrument”. The RSE involves two steps. The first step is
5

to ascertain whether an autonomous vessel remains safe and environmentally viable within present
IMO conventions and future goals. The second step is to analyse how the MASS operation can be
addressed, considering human, technological and operational factors (IMO, 2018). The Maritime
Safety Committee (MSC), at its 103rd session, has completed the first step9, which outlines number
of high-priority issues10 that span multiple instruments, and is needed to be addressed at a policy
level to determine future work. MSC also commented that the best way forward for addressing
MASS in the IMO regulatory framework would be to design a goal-based MASS instrument11 in
a comprehensive manner (IMO, 2021b).
1.3

Problem statement

The maritime transport industry serves about 90% of global trade and significantly contributes to
global economic development (UNCTAD, 2020). In this era of highly complicated technology,
conventional ships are prone to maritime threats and then comes the question for autonomous
unmanned vessels. Non-state actors, criminals/terrorists could use the vulnerability of AS to
perpetrate maritime crime. As the application of unmanned ships advances, it is obvious that there
will also be repercussions for the global legal framework in place to strengthen maritime security
(Klein, 2019). It is critical to review AS vulnerability and assess the impacts of AS on maritime
security. At the same time, it is fundamental to seek the most appropriate mitigation measures to
address these vulnerabilities.
Further, it is the responsibility of the coastal state for maintenance of law enforcement and
maritime security inside the territorial sea. The maritime threats are countered by the conduct of
frequent constabulary patrols and maritime security operations by law enforcement agencies, coast
guard and naval forces, including peacetime boarding operations per maritime zones and
navigational regimes reflected in the UNCLOS Article 11012 (Kraska, 2010). A State's right to

9

MSC.1-Circ.1638

10

MASS terminology and definitions, Functional and operational requirements of remote control station/centre,
Possible designation of remote operator as seafarer
11

MASS Code

12

A warship or military aircraft or duly authorised ships and aircraft on government service towards law enforcement
exercise powers to visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) on the high seas ‘right of visit’ under UNCLOS article 110.

6

engage in such activities is based on its exercise of sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction
over its maritime zones(Klein et al., 2020). Law enforcement agencies may also undertake
boarding on foreign-flagged vessels for various reasons. The advent of AS in the maritime domain
will create operational and practical challenges for law enforcement agencies who act on behalf of
the respective coastal state to maintain governance at sea. Thus, exploration of AS implications on
maritime law enforcement is considered indispensable.
1.4

Objectives of the study

The following are the research's objectives: •

To critically study autonomous unmanned ship (s) impacts on maritime security and

discuss the mitigation measures.
•

To examine autonomous unmanned ship (s) implications on maritime law enforcement

and explore the way forward.
1.5

Research questions

The research study will answer the following research questions:


What are the likely impacts of autonomous unmanned ships on maritime security and what
mitigation measures should be adopted to address these impacts?



What are the challenges anticipated by maritime law enforcement agencies in the
autonomous shipping, and how should these challenges be addressed?

1.6

Research methodology and methods

The nature of research is a deciding factor in choosing an appropriate research methodology. The
research is about autonomous ship technology and its implications on maritime security for which
nil historical data (relevant cases) is available. The researcher plans to address the identified
research questions through maritime security incident scenarios. A mixed-method approach
(triangulation) is utilised to gain inputs from experts and survey to understand the research problem
best. Figure 5 shows the approach of the study.

7

Figure 5. Process of Research Methodology (prepared by Author)
1.7

Expected outcomes

The expected results out of this study are appended below:


The research will identify the possible implications of autonomous (unmanned) ships

for maritime security and law enforcement.


The research will familiarise about vulnerabilities of autonomous ship (s) operations.



The research may serve as a tool for coastal state (s)/ law enforcement agencies to deal

with security incidents involving autonomous ships in future.


To stimulate involved maritime stakeholders13 to take cognisance of security

challenges that may emerge for autonomous ships and simultaneously develop effective
mitigation strategies for secure maritime transportation.

13

Regulatory bodies {IMO, Coastal state (s)/ law enforcement agencies, designers, owners/operators)

8

1.8

Scope and limitations

MASS is a new technology and evolving. The lack of historical data or research on MASS
implications on maritime security and law enforcement is considered one of the primary
limitations. Thus, maritime security incidents (scenarios) are analysed through mixed-method
(triangulation) to fill the necessary research gaps.
1.9

Structure

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one covers an introduction to the research
topic, problem statement, establishes the objectives, research questions, the methodology adopted
and mentions the scope of the research work. Chapter two is a literature review focusing on the
AS opportunities and uncertainties. It further discusses the maritime security, selected security
incidents (scenarios) and law enforcement aspects of AS. Chapter three discusses the methodology
for this study and explains the approach, the questionnaires survey and personal interviews of the
participants. Chapter four describes and analyses the selected security scenarios and present
individual scenario analyses. Finally, chapter five provides a conclusion and recommendations for
the research.

9

Chapter 2 - Literature Review
2.1

Introduction

The UNCLOS, regarded as the “constitution for the ocean”, establishes a legal framework within
which states parties must act, but it does not define maritime security and makes only a few
references to it (Cook, 2020). IMO progressively strive to introduce higher safety and security
standards in shipping. Higher impetus on maritime safety, in fact, become a major proponent for
businesses to invest in autonomous ship or MASS underpinned by transformational technologies
(Komianos, 2018; Kretschmann et al., 2017). However, operating autonomous commercial ships
also implies that risk profiles, responsibilities and accountabilities will be different compared to
conventional ships (Kim & Mallam, 2020). MASS will fundamentally restructure the operational
concept of shipping operations, signifies the surfacing of new hazards, risks and security concerns
which calls for new measures to mitigate or eliminate them. In regard to the physical security of
MASS, it is envisaged that AS operations may involve higher boarding and robbery (Honekamp,
2018). Moreover, the absence of crew creates a significant security gap that necessitates a risk
mitigation strategy. In future, security teams in pre-determined geographic zones may inspect the
AS to ensure it is safe to leave or enter the port (Komianos, 2018). The following sections explore
elements of MASS opportunities and uncertainties, introduction to maritime security, law
enforcement and security incident (scenarios) identification.
2.2

MASS - Perceived Opportunities and Uncertainties

2.2.1 Opportunities
Autonomous ship (s) is a possible answer to many shipping issues. That is why various developers
are embracing the MASS concept. Moreover, few countries tie it to the objectives of sustainability
(de Klerk et al., 2021). “Human errors are responsible for 96 per cent” of the incidents at sea.
Advanced automation is expected to reduce human-related errors and marine accidents.
Undoubtedly, MASS is expected to support tedious and dangerous maritime activities (Porathe et
al., 2018). The other primary motivation for the development of AS is to reduce manning cost14
for seafarers which accounts for at least 40 per cent of vessel operating cost. Also, the popularity

14

Includes wages, provisions, travel and repatriation, pensions, insurance, and litigating personal injury claims.
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of the seafaring profession has been reduced significantly, and only selected labour supply
countries are supplying maritime force (Pribyl & Weigel, 2018). Replacing seafarers will
definitely lead to reduction in the risk factor of piracy and the hostage situation for vessels
operating in HRA and cut insurance coverage costs (Carey, 2017; Kobyliński, 2018).
2.2.2 Uncertainties
Several risks would accompany the benefits of autonomous ship technology (Komianos, 2018).
MASS would be controlled from a remote control station. Thus, opens the third dimension in
vessel controlling mechanism other than ship itself and ports. In addition, handling a vessel in the
harbour will also pose a challenge (Pribyl & Weigel, 2018). Van Hooydonk (2014) likewise
identifies drawbacks of technology, and considers that shore controllers would be significantly
constrained in their intuition for adequately assessing and deciding about situations at sea.
Another central issue is cyber threats that are expected to increase when a vessel eventually
operates purely remotely or in autonomous mode (Kobyliński, 2018; Tam & Jones, 2018).
Kobylinski (2018) and Habdank (2019) speculate a potential risk that pirates may hack a ship and
electronically take control. As a result, a situation may arise wherein pirates remotely sail a ship
to a specific destination and transfer valuable freight from the vessel. Pirates or terrorists may also
use the ship's navigating power to blackmail and threaten society by deliberately directing vessels
into port or other vital locations. MASS may also be used by criminals to carry out attacks and
transport contraband in concealment (Kim et al., 2020).
2.3

Shipping and Maritime Security – A background

As highlighted above, MASS will influence the maritime domain, and mentioned threats will have
visible implications on maritime security. Maritime security has been a focus amongst influential
global security actors since the beginning of the 1990s (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017). Piracy,
trafficking and environmental crime at sea are increasingly viewed as a significant challenge for
the human security of coastal nations and are also considered threats to global commerce and
energy security (Bueger et al., 2020). Currently, the primary focus of many nations in maritime
security is on piracy, terrorism, weapon proliferation, drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking
(Bueger et al., 2020). However, maritime security is not optimum at all levels and in all areas. It
has been relatively easy for some countries (mainly developed) to implement the global measures,

11

particularly those with an effective maritime administration. Few countries face more significant
problems, and these relate to physical security provisions for the ships and ports and security in
the maritime surroundings (Herbert-Burns et al., 2019). The advent of AS in commercial shipping
and its maritime activity raises questions of these vessels fitting into existing ocean governance
structures (Kim et al., 2020; Klein, 2019).
2.3.1 What is Maritime Security?
As the research is primarily focused on MASS and its impacts on maritime security, it is
indispensable to discuss maritime security in detail. There are several definitions, meanings, and
connotations for “security15” and “maritime security16”(Andritsos, 2013). Natalie Klein (2011) as
well states that word maritime security has diverse connotations for different actors. The military's
view differs from that of the shipping industry. US naval operation concept highlights it as
“Ensuring the freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce and the protection of ocean resources,
as well as securing the maritime domain from nation-state threats, terrorism, drug trafficking and
other forms of transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction and illegal seaborne
immigration” (Klein, 2011, p.8).
In contrast to military definitions, maritime security for ship owners implies a transport
system and relates to the safe transport of cargo without interference or being subjected to criminal
activity (Klein, 2011). Jones (2006) explains ship owners view and professes the concept of
maritime security as “the state of a shipping company/vessel/crew/port, being of feeling secure”,
or “the safety of a shipping company/vessel/crew/port against such threats as terrorism, piracy,
and other criminal activities”. Maritime security is a buzzword that draws attention to looming
threats and prepares support for legislation to address them. However, no definitive definition of
maritime security has yet developed. Maritime security has been commonly discussed, pointing to
‘threats’ that prevail in the maritime domain (Bueger, 2015).

15

“The set of means/actions through which safety is ensured, in particular against intentional threats; it encompasses
all measures, actions or systems aiming at preventing intentional threats from compromising safety”
16

“The combination of preventive measures intended to protect shipping and port facilities against threats of
intentional unlawful acts.”
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In the future, integration of IT and OT systems will result in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
on which the safe operation of contemporary and future ship depends (Kavallieratos et al., 2020).
AS will be operated remotely from a third location i.e. SCC. In addition, the fundamental change
is that these ships will be crewless. Overall, AS and SCC alongwith existing maritime transport
system (conventional ships and ports) will play a significant role in establishing new framework
of maritime security (figure 6).

Figure 6. Schematic breakdown of the maritime security threats in context of AS. Prepared by
Author based on information from Andritsos (2013)
2.3.2

Maritime Security Instruments – International Shipping

For decades, various low-intensity and substantial security incidents in the maritime domain were
reported, which served as the foundation for developing security instruments for global shipping.
The current security measures for the maritime domain are introduced at the international, regional,
and national levels (Herbert-Burns et al., 2019; Metaparti, 2010). In following sections, most
relevant IMO and global measures (instruments) for maritime security are discussed (figure 7).
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Figure 7.IMO and global measures for maritime security. Prepared by Author based on
information from IMO (2021a)

2.3.2.1 SUA Convention 1988 and 2005 SUA Protocol
The 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro sparked international outrage, and the
IMO passed a resolution in response A.584(14)17 and MSC/Circ.44318. Following the adoption of
resolutions, the UNGA adopted resolution 40/61, calling on all states to :
“Take all appropriate measures at the national level with a view to the speedy and final
elimination of the problem of international terrorism, such as the harmonization of domestic
legislation with existing international conventions, the fulfilment of assumed international
obligations”
Pursuant to the Achille Lauro incident, the IMO adopted the first security convention in March
1988, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime

17

Measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crew.

18

Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crew onboard ships.
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Navigation (SUA), which was duly amended in 2005 and adopted in the form of Protocols to the
SUA treaties (the 2005 Protocols) (Attard, 2014; Cook, 2020).
2.3.2.2 ISPS Code
The 9/11terrorist attacks in the United States provoked a substantial shift and spurred regulatory
authorities to investigate security aspects in shipping. As a result, International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code was proposed and adopted in 2004, designed to prevent ships from
being used as weapons by terrorists (Metaparti, 2010). A new maritime security regime was
incorporated in SOLAS, chapter XI-2 on special measures to enhance maritime security, including
the ISPS code. Part A of the code is mandatory, while part B contains guidance. The regulations
in this chapter also require all ships to be equipped with a ship security alert system (Komianos,
2018).
The ISPS code objective is to identify security threats and implement security measures and
create obligations for governments, administrations, and ships on a national and international level
(Dalaklis, 2017). In order to fulfil these objectives, the ISPS code requires that the vessel operator
designate a Company Security Officer (CSO) and Ship Security Officer (SSO). In addition, a ship
must create Ship Security Plan (SSP), obtain a vessel International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC)
after Ship Security Assessments (SSAs). Almost the same procedures are also needed for a ISPS
complied ports. The application of the ISPS code involves three major phases (Figure 8)
(Komianos, 2018; Progoulakis & Nikitakos, a2019).
Many researchers recommend that ISPS should be amended to have adequate security
measures in crewless ships since it is expected that it will be difficult to apply current regulations
(Dalaklis, 2017; Kim, H. & Yang, 2019). Technical and institutional considerations should take
place to strengthen the security since the absence of “security officers/personnel” in the case of an
autonomous (crewless) ship is a significant challenge (Kim et al., 2020; Komianos, 2018). The
recently concluded RSE classified several IMO instruments as “High Priority” including SOLAS
chapter XI-2 which needs to be addressed before all other instruments (IMO, 2021).

15

Figure 8. ISPS Code Process Phase (Progoulakis & Nikitakos, 2019)
Also, the ISPS code defines security incidents, particularly in connection to ships. The ship
security assessment should evaluate all conceivable threats, according to ISPS (part B), which may
include the following security incidents (Table 2) (IMO, 2021a).
Table 2. List of security incidents. Prepared by Author based on information from IMO (2021a)
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2.3.2.3 Maritime Security in non-IMO treaties
The third UN conference on the law of the sea featured maritime security including violation of
territorial sovereignty and piracy. UNCLOS recognise three important navigational regimes19.
Each of these regimes attempts to strike a balance between two vital competing interests of coastal
states for economic and security reasons, the other being the interests of states who strive to
maintain freedom of navigation and overflight. UNCLOS part VII contains vital provisions dealing
with maritime security, particularly article 8820. Maritime security is seen as a shared concern
among many countries. Furthermore, UNCLOS also contains provisions (article 100) to combat
piracy, and deliberates on the collaboration of all states in combating piracy on the high seas or in
any other location outside of any state's jurisdiction (Attard, 2014). Osinuga (2020) suspects that
AS would be targeted by cyber-pirates who would most likely be ashore and may not be considered
pirates in the traditional sense, and suggests that UNCLOS may be expanded to assimilate and
absorb the variants of piracy which may cover cyber pirates.
2.4

Security Incident (Scenario) – MASS

MASS is likely to alter the pattern of pirates, terrorist and criminal activities. The number of
hostage situations is likely to decrease. The lack of crew, on the other hand, would enhance
attempts to seize the entire vessel for its precious cargo. Furthermore, there is a potential that
MASS will be utilized for illegal cargo shipments, including arms and drugs. In addition, port
security also needs to be reviewed in the MASS era (Kim et al., 2020).
AS, in addition to traditional security threats, will also be affected severely by cyber-security
threats. AS and SCCs both can become target of cyber-attacks. There could be multiple maritime
security incident scenarios. However, the researcher considers cyber or physical attack on SCCs,
hijacking of AS by pirates or cyber-hackers, cases of armed robbery in harbour or at anchorages,
stowaways incidents and transnational maritime crime/drug trafficking as relevant maritime
threats, having direct implications on maritime security in the context of MASS. In subsequent

19

Innocent passage applies in the territorial sea and archipelagic waters, transit passage applies to straits used for
international navigation, and archipelagic sea lanes passage applies to archipelagic waters.
20

UNCLOS article 88 referred to reservation of the high seas for peaceful purposes “the high seas shall be reserved
for peaceful purposes”
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sections, a detailed review has been undertaken on selected threat (incidents) in the context of
MASS.
2.4.1 Cyber-security threats
Cyber-attack is a hidden threat that can have very serious consequences for the maritime transport
industry. In May 2021, a cyber-attack crippled a US colonial oil pipeline that connected 30 oil
refineries. The heavy ransom paid by the company to the hackers to restore the system shows its
far-reaching implications for critical industries, including shipping. The success of such attacks
may encourage similar attacks globally (Allianz, 2021). It is alarming as such attacks can also be
planned and executed by non-state actors using autonomous ships or by attack on SCC.
The interconnectivity between a ship and shore, a core requirement for an autonomous ship
to work, may increase potential cyber-attacks on maritime vessels (Tam & Jones, 2018). IMO
defines cyber risk as a “measure of the extent to which a technology asset is threatened by a
potential circumstance or event, which may result in shipping-related operational, safety or
security failures as a consequence of information or systems being corrupted, lost or
compromised” (IMO, 2017). RSE as well identified connectivity and cybersecurity as potential
gaps that are required for MASS operations (IMO, 2021).
Honekamp (2018) speculates that the security issues about communication and IT systems of an
AS would be an essential aspect that needs to be considered. (Kim et al., 2020) recognize the threat
of cybercrime as a source of worry. Cyber terrorists can compromise the communication link used
by MASS to control the function from afar.
A study conducted by (Kunz & Ó hÉigeartaigh, 2020) provides a general insight into possible uses
of robotics and AI, which would affect global security in different spaces, including civil aviation,
shipping including autonomous shipping and ground vehicle safety and security. The study
contemplates that the deployment of autonomous ships may be the most significant robot-related
threat to global security from civil waterborne vehicles. It would be a likely transport for terrorists
as a drone carrying explosives or biological, chemical or radioactive bombs, and since many large
cities are situated along coasts or rivers, it may be disastrous.
The cyber threats would not only affect AS, but will also have equal implications on SCC
infrastructure. Shore or Remote Control Centre will play a relatively important role for MASS
18

(Rylander & Man, 2016). These centres will be modern virtual bridge or machinery control rooms
for navigators, virtual captains, and engineers to operate these highly cyber-physical sophisticated
ships. There would be a requirement to have reliable connectivity21 and infrastructure (Kutsuna et
al., 2019). SCCs will be equipped with essential components including a two-way communication
system (terrestrial and satellite connectivity), connectivity with sea/land-based actors, sensor suites
(weather, remote sensing), and last critical component is the operator (human element) itself
(Wróbel et al., 2020). In RSE outcome, potential gap in respect of SCC or Remote Control Centre
(RCC) is regarded as high priority issue that cut across several IMO instruments. However,
SOLAS chapter XI-2 has not been included as common potential gaps for RCC (IMO, 2021).
In future a single SCC may operate several vessels to economise the efforts. In terms of a
security hazard, SCC-ship communication or SCC itself may be attacked by cyber pirates or
criminals to meet their agendas.
2.4.2 Hijacking and piracy
The Gulf of Guinea has emerged as the world’s piracy hotspot22, and it is threatening since vessels
are being targeted at high seas (Allianz, 2021). Although, it is speculated that, MASS will not be
targeted view absence of crew however, this view is refuted by many (Habdank, 2019).
The use of maritime assets, including merchant ships in malicious activities have been
highlighted in several studies (Klein, 2011). Further, many incidents were observed wherein
criminals/pirates embarked on ships and overpowered crew and took control of the ship (Jiang &
Lu, 2020a).
Rødseth & Burmeister (2015) considers that terrorists using an autonomous crewless ship
as a remotely controlled weapon is a very high-risk scenario and an unlikely event as long as
communication systems, position sensing and onboard control systems are appropriately designed.

21

With maritime regulators, business partners (sipping company and agents), VTS, port authorities, the Coast Guard/
Navy, Pilots
22

22 separate incident recorded in 2020
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Osinuga (2020) as well anticipates that AS would most likely not be susceptible to conventional
maritime piracy. However, it may be hijacked by “cyber pirates.”.
On the other hand, Van Hooydonk (2014) considers it would be unrealistic to expect pirates
and terrorists to vanish from the high seas in the age of AS. He further thinks these ships to be a
softer target for the criminals.
Klein (2019) escalated this viewpoint by speculating the use of AS by non-state actors to
commit a crime like a terrorist attack against subsea infrastructure, including oil and natural gas
pipelines or telecommunication cables or the shipment of illicit cargo across national boundaries.
According to Petrig (2020), criminals have already started embracing new technology to
compromise maritime security. There is a real chance that criminals in the future will use
autonomous vessels frequently and in a variety of ways to fulfil their missions. In her opinion,
despite the rather apparent maritime security dimension of expanded automation in shipping, the
relevant doctrinal analysis is still in its primary stage. Further, the potential use (and abuse) of
autonomous technologies, including ships concerning maritime security, has received very little
scholarly attention so far. Coito (2021) warned that the crewless vessel would be more exposed to
transnational criminal activity, such as theft and piracy.
2.4.3 Stowaway
Van Hooydonk (2014) contemplate that apart from the possible passenger onboard an unmanned
ship, the only person who retains his maritime law status is the stowaway23 and it would be illusory
to think that stowaways will not board them.
Stowaways can be categorised as refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants, illegal
migrants, criminals and terrorists. Criminals and terrorist as stowaways are probably the most
threatening. Terrorists look for easy access to reach their targets to plan clandestine attacks.
Stowaways represents a global concern, not just a problem for one country (Aguocha, 2018).

23 According to FAL convention, a stowaway is "A person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo which is subsequently
loaded on the ship, without the consent of the shipowner or the Master or any other responsible person and who is
detected on board the ship after it has departed from a port, or in the cargo while unloading it in the port of arrival,
and is reported as a stowaway by the master to the appropriate authorities"
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For the same purpose, deck watches in ports and search of the ship are undertaken to
prevent persons from embarking in ports and hiding onboard and to ensure that stowaways are
detected if any succeed to embark on board. The obligation for an autonomous ship (remote
controlled and fully autonomous without crew) implies that physical manning is needed in port
since appropriate deck watch and search of the vessel would not be utterly feasible through
cameras and sensors.
2.4.4 Transnational Organised Crime/ Drug Trafficking
According to Bueger & Edmunds (2020), transnational organised crime24 or described as “blue
crime” (figure 9) is on the rise and recently been recognised as a significant security issue.

Figure 9. Categorization of three blue crimes (Bueger & Edmunds, 2020)
The maritime domain has been a locus of activity for transnational criminal and terrorist
organisations in addition to other related benefits25, which try to exploit mare liberum for ill-gotten

24

Maritime piracy, the illicit trafficking of people, narcotics, arms or waste by the sea, and environmental crimes such
as pollution
25

Food, Energy and trade benefits
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gains. Maritime drug trafficking is a sophisticated and well financed network (Coito, 2021). Klein
(2019) also anticipates that AS will be used by criminals to undertake smuggling.
According to (Rødseth, Ørnulf Jan & Burmeister, 2015), the use of (civilian) MASS in any
illegal activity or a transnational crime is expected to be very low but cannot be completely
overruled. Coito (2021) foresee that transnational criminal organisations will seize upon the same
technology and exacerbate illicit drug trafficking. He further speculates practical difficulty in
prosecuting a remote, anonymous operator even after a successful interdiction of a remotecontrolled or fully autonomous drug trafficking vessel.
Bueger & Edmunds (2020) further illustrates adaptability in blue crime, which is dynamic and
adaptable. Criminal operating in one form of crime may also engage in others simultaneously or
shift from one type to another. Three motivations for change and evolution in maritime crime can
be identified: countermeasure driven inspirations, opportunity-driven motives, and those that
originated from unintended outcomes. The criminal also shifts to crimes where countermeasures
are less intense and the risk-reward balances more favourable, and the phenomenon has been
described as displacement. The counter-piracy measures off the Somali coast resulted in the
decline of piracy. However, it is believed that pirate organisational structure remains intact, and
their leaders remain at large and are now involved in other forms of maritime crime to which their
network, resources, and skills are well suited, including arms and people trafficking (Bueger &
Edmunds, 2020).
It is likely that, criminals will shift their focus to autonomous technologies to undertake blue
crimes. Leuprecht et al. (2016) conducted a qualitative study and observed that transnational
organized criminals and terrorists consider the global economy ideally equipped to meet illicit
goods and service demands. Figure 10 illustrates data on the seized narco vessels between 19932013, by United States which also include submersible and semi-submersible vessels (Ramírez &
Bunker, 2015).
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Figure 10. Data on seized narco vessels between 1993-2013 (Ramírez & Bunker, 2015)
2.5

Law Enforcement at Sea

Maritime law enforcement is vital for states to maintain maritime security. It gets reflected in every
maritime strategy, which keeps them an effective means of preventing and suppressing illegal
activities at sea. Law enforcement operations include surveillance, stopping and boarding, search
and inspection, reporting arrest or seizure of persons or vessels, detention and imposition of
sanctions (Galani & Evans, 2020). The practical nuances of AS are of particular concern to
maritime security experts. The maritime law enforcement community considers AS an asset and a
threat vector that criminals would be exploiting to avoid detection (Allen, 2018).
In respect of high seas, UNCLOS article 110 govern the Visit Board Search Seizure (VBSS)
operations in cases of reasonable suspicion that a vessel is engaged in piracy, the slave trade or
without nationality. Under Article 110(3), a law enforcement vessel may “send a boat under the
command of an officer to the suspected ship”, and the boarding party inspect the ship’s documents
and conduct further examination26 (Guilfoyle, 2017; Klein, 2019).
Klein (2019) critically discusses the case of suspect AS, where the requirement to determine
if the AS is a “ship” that is flagged to a state and, if so, that State’s consent must be sought for any
possible boarding. However, she considers it to be problematic (Klein, 2019).

26

Conduct search onboard, if suspicion remains
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Further, under UNCLOS, all state parties are to cooperate to suppress illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances in the high seas27. 1988 Drug convention elaborated this
cooperation for law enforcement purposes. According to article 17 of said convention, the right of
visit may be exercised by law enforcers onboard vessels involved in illicit trafficking (Klein,
2019).
2.6

Literature Review Summary s

From a broad discussion and literature review on AS and elements of maritime security, it can be
inferred that AS may have certain implications on maritime security and law enforcement.
However, exact implications cannot be accrued since there is no historical or incidental data
available. In the next chapter, the researcher discusses methodology employed to study the impacts
of AS on these two aspects which are then analysed in chapter-4.

27

UNCLOS article 108
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Chapter 3 – Methodology
3.1

Introduction

The chapter gives an outline of employed methodology for the research. The subsequent sections
provide insight about adopted methodology, reasons for its selection, research approach, process,
data collection, ethical issues, validity/ reliability and limitations.
3.1.1 Adopted Research Methodology
Effective design and carrying out research can be complex activities. Research may incorporate
various methods which categorically depends on their suitability to achieve the research aim and
objectives (Verschuren et al., 2010). A mixed-method (concurrent triangulation design) approach
has been selected, citing the peculiarity of the research about autonomous unmanned ships and its
implications on maritime security and law enforcement. The researcher pragmatically utilised
open-ended (qualitative) and close-ended (quantitative) data gathering methods and involved both
forms of data analysis in a mixed-methods approach to elucidate the research objectives (Creswell,
2021). Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004) illustrate mixed method as “the class of research where
the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods,
approaches, concepts or language into a single study” (p.17). The overarching purpose of mixedmethod research is to enhance and improve a study's result by integrating qualitative and
quantitative research components (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017).
3.1.2 Rationale for Research Methodology
The freedom to apply the best procedures, regardless of their paradigm, in more complex
circumstances is a major benefit of the selected methodology. Certain research topics warrant
investigation by multiple methods spread across different paradigms, and mixed methods are likely
to provide such freedom and flexibility (Kumar, 2018). The technology for autonomous ships is
fast evolving. Its impact on numerous maritime disciplines is still in its early stages and difficult
to predict.
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3.1.3 Research Approach
The researcher used the literature review to generate relevant security incident scenarios for AS
and validated/analysed through surveys and personal interviews of experts. A survey is
inexpensive, provide anonymity and obtain information from relevant individuals. Whereas,
interviews are appropriate for complex situations and helpful in extracting in-depth information.
The scenario generation and validation are considered an apt tool for establishing the basis given
the uncertainty and lack of historical data on AS and its implications on maritime security and law
enforcement. Researcher-driven scenario generating processes might be quantitative, qualitative,
or mixed (Star et al., 2016). Figure 11 illustrates the process.

Figure 11.Flowchart of the methodology, (prepared by Author)
3.2

Research Process

3.2.1 Literature Review
The goal of the review was to find, select, and critically appraise appropriate literature on MASS
and its implications on maritime security, as well as to analyse the data gathered from the reviewed
literature. The process of doing a literature review might be iterative. Unexpected complications
may occur throughout the review, necessitating changes to the research topic or review process.
The literature review identified certain uncertainties/vulnerabilities of AS for maritime security
and law enforcement. Each of these security threats are regarded as a scenario and analysed to
address research objectives.
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3.2.2 Scenario Validation
The current era characterised by uncertainty, innovation, and disruptive change demands scenario
planning techniques for their known effectiveness in uncertainty and complex conditions. Scenario
planning incites strategic reasoning and overcomes thinking barriers by generating multiple
futures. Scenarios are considered a valuable tool that encourages organizations to prepare for
possible eventualities and become more innovative (Amer et al., 2013). Furthermore, the scenario
method allows for the development of future strategies and solutions. Scenario analysis examines
what is likely to happen by considering various outcomes (Kim, Y. & Cha, 2012). The study
utilised scenarios to look into AS vulnerabilities for maritime security by analysing/validating
selected security incidents.
3.3

Ethical Issues

This study necessitated the inclusion of a human component. Considerations of 'ethical issues'
takes precedence during the data gathering process. The survey and interviews have to be approved
after a thorough assessment to ensure that they met the highest ethical standards. Before any action
involving human activity was undertaken, the WMU Ethics Committee evaluated every
component of the survey and interview questions. In addition, to preserve the participant’s rights
and privacy, factors such as secrecy, anonymity, data protection, and the flexibility to withdraw
from participation were closely adhered to.
Moreover, all of the participant’s contributions were voluntary, and no fees were charged for
participating in the research. No changes or additions to the received data were made, and all
material will be deleted after the dissertation's final submission deadline. Appendix A contains the
protocol for the WMU Research Ethnic Committee.
3.4

Data Collection

Data collection for personal interviews and questionnaire surveys began on 18 Aug 2021 and was
completed on 17 Sep 2021. Both methods are described in the subsequent section.
3.4.1

Personal Interviews

A total of 11 personal interviews of Maritime Experts viz maritime academician and researchers,
law enforcement agency officials were carried out via Zoom/Google meet/Microsoft meeting
applications. Maritime researchers with wide experience in the MASS research projects and
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maritime security participated whose perspectives were vital for the research. Interviews of senior
law enforcement agency officials who also hold requisite experience in MASS concept
participated. Such blend was considered most suitable for the research objective. The personal
interviews of the experts were composed of 20 questions. The consent form and question templates
for interviews are placed in Appendix B.
3.4.2 Questionnaire survey
The survey has been developed on basis of security incidents selected as scenarios to achieve
research objectives. The survey aims to maximize the participation of maritime professionals and
maritime security experts, including Naval and Coast Guard officials. The questionnaire survey
was composed of two parts :


Section 1 – The first section (6 questions) focussed on the personal information of the
participants



Section 2 – The second section (23 questions), including 3 questions focused on
participant’s familiarity with the concept of MASS, maritime security and law
enforcement, was obtained. Subsequent questions gathered opinions on various
security incidents (scenarios) and law enforcement involving MASS.

To best capture the diverse viewpoints, the responses were rated on a Likert scale in a
multiple-choice question format. For the most part, the scaled responses 'Strongly disagree,'
'Disagree,' 'Neutral,' 'Agree,' 'Strongly agree,' and 'Don't know' were used. Electronic data
collection, notably the survey monkey platform, was utilized to save time and participant's ease.
The survey was also hosted on IMarEST28 Special Interest Group (MASS SIG) to get a global
response. In addition, the survey questionnaire was forwarded to various law enforcement
agencies. The questionnaire survey template is placed in Appendix C.
3.5

Limitations

The researcher observed many practical limitations as the concept of MASS is still evolving, and
there is no empirical security incident data or cases available. The participant's responses are based

28

The Institute of Marine Engineering, Science, and Technology (IMarEST) is an international membership
organization and learned community for maritime professionals
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on their perception and may be biased due to their professional attitude and one-sided knowledge
in the field. The time limit was one of the significant limitations, which drastically reduced the
scope of the research. The participation level was also affected due to the nature of research and
competing interests. Also, the expertise in the inter-disciplinary domain was crucial, and access to
such experts within a limited timeframe was scarce.
3.6

Brief Summary of the chapter

The chapter gives an overview of the research methodology to achieve the research objectives.
The researcher employed a mixed-method approach to explore the research questions. The process
involved selecting relevant security incidents (scenarios) through literature review, followed by
validation of selected security incidents by personal interviews and survey questionnaires to study
the impacts of MASS on maritime security and law enforcement.

Chapter 4 - Data Description and Analysis
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4.1

Introduction

The chapter contains statistical findings, transcribed extracts, and analyses to address research
questions.
4.2

Survey questionnaire and interviews

Survey
A total of 105 respondents, predominantly male (90%) from 25 countries, participated in the
questionnaire survey conducted from 18 Aug 21 to 17 Sep 21. Overall, the respondents reflect a
broad spectrum of different parts of the maritime sector, including representation from law
enforcement agencies. The participant’s knowledge on three areas was also assessed to analyse
and extract accurate findings: the concept of AS, the concept and relevance of maritime security,
and law enforcement at sea. Mostly all participants found familiar with the concept of maritime
security (except 3) and with the concept of law enforcement (except 4), whereas 6 and 15 reported
not at all familiar or not so familiar with the concept of MASS. Out of 105 participants, only 96
were found valid as nine skipped section-II of the survey. Finally, to maintain the quality of results,
32 respondents have been excluded from the evaluation. Accordingly, 73 remaining respondents
were only considered for evaluation. The demographic data and result of survey is placed at
Appendix D.
Interviews
A total of 11 semi-structured interviews were carried out, during which participants responded
with their opinions based on interview questions on selected scenarios. The participants were
maritime experts and significant stakeholders connected with MASS projects, law enforcement
officials, shipping experts, classification societies, insurance companies and experts from
academia. An overview of participants is appended in Table 3.
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Table 3.Overview of interview participants (prepared by Author)

4.3
Study of Impacts on Maritime Security and challenges for law enforcement using
Security incidents (scenarios)
In order to critically study the impacts of the AS on maritime security and challenges anticipated
by maritime law enforcement agencies, security incidents are selected as scenarios on criteria
discussed in para 2.4, and described in Table 4 in descending order of severity consequences. In
each section, the researcher has described a particular scenario briefly (pure assumptions of the
researcher for the discussion/analysis) which then analysed using themes namely Vulnerability of
technology and Mitigation measures.
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Table 4. Selected security incidents (Scenarios) (prepared by Author)

4.4

Scenario – 1

Scenario-1 relates to intrusion/attack on SCC which is operating/monitoring several AS (figure
12). In order to attack military installations in the area, a banned non-state actor group plans and
undertakes intrusion into the SCC. Upon gaining control, the group direct one AS toward vital
military installation/ships in the port.

Figure 12. Scenario-1 “Intrusion/attack on SCC”
Analysis
Vulnerability of technology
In higher level of ship autonomy, the control of AS is handed over to a dedicated Shore control
center (SCC), and an operator is able to monitor the operation of several vessels simultaneously
and intervene remotely. The growing usage of networked ICT technology, opens up possibility of
accessing the system virtually and to exploit the system. SCC is also subject to multiple security
threats including possibilities of cyber and physical intrusion. All interviewees have major
concerns about security of SCC-ship communication. R-3 comments, “Risk surely cannot be
ignored, but it’s too early to anticipate.”

32

According to R-7, “Given the rapid change in the threat scenario and the technology
(hacking methods), unique security challenges will be posed in context of unmanned operability,
where cyber infiltration element would be prominent.” On the contrary, R-8 considers, 5G would
be a leap for communication and harder to gain access illegally, so is the control centre. However,
cyber-security being a known risk, could potentially make it a target.
In response to SQ2329 (figure 13), majority of participants concurs with vulnerability of SCCs
against cyber-risks.

Figure 13.Participants response to SQ23 (prepared by Author)
Next to these examples, it may also be that non-state actors attack directly on any SCC. In AS,
SCC, is crucial in ship operation. Physical security of SCCs, wherever located, would also become
paramount. R-1 and R-2 also considers cyber as well as physical intrusion as a possibility.
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Communication and networking infrastructure of MASS shore control centres may also be vulnerable to cyber
threats
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R-1 in response to IQ 1330,
“SCC being a critical component in MASS operation, needs special attention in terms of
safety. The presence of unwanted person inside an SCC implies illicit control of ships being
operated by the SCC” and further commented “if I was a criminal, I would go for the SCC”
Most participants concurs with SQ2431 (figure 14) statement in survey as well.

Figure 14. Participant response to SQ 24 (prepared by Author)
SMEs in a qualitative study by Roberts et al. (2019) also raises question that hackers who takes
over SCC control may instruct the vessel to go to a place where it could be boarded by attackers.
Thus, sealing off an autonomous ship from physical attack would appear to be a lot less helpful in
these scenarios (Carey, 2017). Moreover, a SCC can be located in any part of the world, it can
either be a highly developed state with lesser crime rate and security vulnerability or in some
state(s) with higher security threats. As a result, if any of these centers are vulnerable to such
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Is there any possibility that the shore control centres may also be attacked (cyber pirates or physical attack) by
criminals/non-state actors to fulfil their goals?
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Non-state actors may also attack shore control centres for using MASS as a weapon against sensitive targets
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threats, maritime security cannot be considered complete. What could go wrong, if a SCC is
attacked?
As per R-2, there is security dimension into SCCs, and probability of both physical as well
as cyber threats. In case these centres are hijacked by hacking, there may be repercussions
including stopping the vessel in the middle of the ocean for purposes such as for loading
illegitimate cargo, for entering the port by terrorist or to crash into a warship.
Mitigation measures
Cyber-security is evolving as a major proponent against variety of cyber-attacks and all experts
considers higher standards to be implemented for AS and SCCs to deter any threats. R-7 perceives
that malicious cyber actors may hack the communication link, and stressed on the system and
processes resilience to prevent such attacks. Therefore, impetus must be given to regular training
(personnel employed at SCCs), drills, audit regimes and vulnerability assessment (penetration
testing or red teaming).
Post 9/11 disaster, government worldwide and in particular United States implemented stringent
measures for better protection of ports and maritime transport. Consequently, higher security
standards were introduced in ports and ships through implementation of ISPS and other measures
such as Container Security Initiatives (CSI).
A state with a higher security environment would like to have proactive security control measures
at these centres. R-2 imagine that state like US would enforce such measures at SCCs.
The SCC as a control room can be compared with aircraft cockpit unlike VTS or ATC which
although directs the safe movement of aircrafts and ships respectively but, do not have the controls.
In the same context, R-2 compared AS/SCC with Germanwings flight32 which was
deliberately crashed by its own co-pilot into mountains. He raised concern over the final authority
for override button for an AS in such case? Therefore, there is clear need to define the procedures
for contingencies, and states would like to enforce higher security barriers in these centres. As a
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On 24 March 2015, flight 9525 (Germanwings) crashed 100 Km from Nice (French Alps) was a deliberate caused
act by the co-pilot.
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mitigation measure, R-2 suggested availability of redundancy or override options in other locations
to take over/hand over facilities for these ships. Therefore, there would be a need of standby SCCs,
which is not only a standby option for intrusion but for other emergencies, and again cyber-security
is important into these process. In order to protect against cyber threats, there should be security
protocols, passwords and encrypted lines to protect the system. He also highlighted training of
professionals as an important aspect.
R-1 and R-2 suggests suitable physical barriers for SCCs. Also, R-2 quote an example of a
remote control station that is closely guarded to avoid any calamity at one of the offshore oil
pumping facilities in the north sea. Similarly, R-1 concurs, “SCC is a high risk asset” which really
need high security both physically and from cyber-attacks.
Since, the role of IMO is also crucial in maintaining maritime security, R-5 suggests that these
centres should comply with IMO standards. In addition, he further suggests IMO to regulate
standards to make uniform policies and requirement for all coastal states. R-6 also concurs with
these threats33, however believes that SCCs would be the responsibility of individual state. He also
mentioned that these threats are arising from the non-state actors and even they are transboundary
in nature. So he considers it to be beyond the IMO control and hence would require attention of
other institutions too.
SCC is regarded as high priority issue as far as revising IMO instruments are concerned in RSE
outcome (IMO, 2021). However, SOLAS chapter XI-2 has not been considered as potential theme
for it.
R-3 somewhat maintain same opinion and reiterate that IMO has been regulating ships under
its mandate, although there are few exceptions under ISM34 and ISPS35 codes, which are clearly
defined36 and limited. Also, IMO has issued some guidance for matters which are beyond its prime
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remit such as non-SOLAS ships or for mooring personnel in ports. He furthered on the complexity
of IMO regulations governing SCC as shore-side infrastructure which is subject to national
jurisdiction and laws seems to be less likely at the moment. However, there could be some regional
solutions37.
Indeed, the SCCs will influence the maritime security atmosphere in the future, and these centres
must be secured against all kinds of security threats, cyber or physical. A single hijacked SCC can
serve hackers several autonomous platforms that can probably be used as per their wish and fancy.
IMO certainly will have a role in securing high standards for these centres.
4.5

Scenario – 2

Scenario-2 relates to the hijacking of unmanned ocean-going AS by pirates or non-state actors
(figure 15). The AS is exiting an international strait in the wee hours and suddenly lose contact
with SCCs. The SCC crew is assimilating it to be a minor communication/network issue, but all
efforts to restore the connection are futile. The SCC crew consequently suspect the hijacking of
the vessel.

Figure 15. Scenario – 2 “Hijacking of AS by pirates/non-state actors”
Analysis
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The EC of the EU, for example, has through its directives direct power for matters passed on to the EC by EU
Member States which includes ISPS implementation
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Vulnerability of technology
One of the major security threats for AS is hijacking, which may result in devastating consequences
affecting its public perception as well (Fan et al., 2020). The hijacking of an AS can be attempted
by a traditional pirate (motivation financial gains) or an ideological/politically motivated non-state
actor group (use as weapon), and both can employ either physical or cyber means to undertake the
same.
The act of "piracy" has two distinct offences: the first is robbery or hijacking, with the goal
of stealing a ship or its cargo. The alternative is kidnapping, which involves threatening the crew
and vessel until a ransom is paid (Tumbarska, 2018).
An autonomous ship is highly technological, fully dependent on networking, AI, and satellite
communication, and being a new technology, brings new risks. When in operation, AI technologies
may introduce security vulnerability (Heikkilä, 2018). Vulnerability to computer hackers hijacking
control is one of the major disadvantages of AS (Li & Fung, 2019).
For unmanned AS, the option for kidnapping and ransom is no longer feasible. So, will
traditional piracy be still a threat for AS? According to maritime executive (2019), pirates still
have reasons to board a ship: the cargo, the vessel and the potential use of both as smuggling tools
or as a weapon. Pirates in Southeast Asia attempt to hijack the ship mainly for its cargo, where
crews occasionally suffer serious injuries (Jiang & Lu, 2020b). Since, no one is onboard, AS is an
easy target for hijackers partly for stealing information and for taking control of the ship. And, at
the hands of hijackers, it will be at their mercy, they may just steal the cargo or do acts of terrorism
on a global scale or drive into an oil rig (Eriksson & Gevriye, 2018).
R-4 anticipates that though the chances of pirates using the ship for ransom is less, one cannot
underestimate the ability and the ingenuity of the pirates to determine alternative methods by
which they can extort money and via take over the AS.
According to R-7, “Probability of physical attacks will be much lower than a cyber event as
AS concept is largely dependent on IT systems onboard and ashore. If security aspects are
categorised into three elements- people, processes and technology, then technology among these
three, is improving considerably whereas people may be considered as a weakest link in security
38

chain.” R-8 though considers it to be an evolving risk, but maintains same opinion as R-7. On the
other hand, R-3 considers that MASS will be more vulnerable to physical attacks by pirates and
armed robbers than conventionally crewed ships. Also, almost half participants in survey agreed
to SQ1038 (figure 16).

Figure 16.Participants response to SQ 10 (prepared by Author)
One strong reason of pirates targeting AS would be the absence of crew, as, in case of AS, we can
assume that there is no resistance from embarking the ship. Whereas, in conventional ships, the
crew becomes first line of defence although their life in this case is at stake.
Traditionally, ships operating in high risk areas (HRA) adhere to strict measures including
guidance39, BMPs40, industry counter-piracy guidance41 promulgated by IMO. A fundamental
advice in one of these circular on piracy or hijacking is “If attackers cannot board a ship, they
cannot hijack it”, which is significantly true in the case of conventional ship. However, in order to
understand vulnerability of AS, whether, in first place, can it be boarded by attackers or pirates. If
answer is ‘Yes’, then whether it can be controlled from onboard positions. And again if answer is
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‘Yes’, what else they need. However, if the answer is ‘No’, what else can be done by them. Will
they leave peacefully keeping everything intact. These are some of the questions which definitely
need answers before AS undertake ocean passage. R-3 explains that though MASS projects are in
developing stages, the scene will quickly change in years to come, and it is likely that
shipowners/operators will not envisage to opening up routes where risk of piracy or armed robbery
is high or observed incidents in recent past.
Nearly all experts during the interview stated that design features of the AS is very crucial factor
in avoiding such incidents. R-1 commented to IQ-142,
“It isn't easy to do something if a ship is designed to not operate from onboard positions.
And, it would be tricky to take the ship somewhere since means of steering would not be available
onboard, except pirates can try to make it inoperative by shutting down the engines, but then
pirates need to have a seagoing tug to steal the ship.”
R-2 as well highlighted the design features of AS, and mentioned about potential MASS designs43
in future .“Ships can be built in a way that even if someone gets onboard, it’s difficult to get into
them”. However, it would also be required to facilitate easy access for those to attend emergencies
or mechanical failures to tug them easily. And, if a ship can be connected for a good reason, it can
very well be connected for a bad reason too.
Jiang & Lu (2020) in their study on piracy in SE Asia highlights importance of influencing
factors (ship’s characteristics, environmental conditions, anti-piracy measures) against maritime
piracy (Table 5). However, in case of hijacking of AS, all these factors would also change
drastically. An autonomous ship may likely have a high freeboard and enclosed structure but is
likely to be slow-moving with a limited allowance for increasing speed. Also AS will not have
appropriate anti-piracy measures such as lookouts and provision of physical defence measures may
have to be provisioned for automatic deployment.
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Do you think there are high possibilities of MASS being hijacked by pirates (physical or cyber) to ask for ransom
for cargo/ launch attacks on vulnerable assets or port installations (collision with warships/grounding in navigable
areas)?
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Rolls Royce AS designs
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Table 5. Influencing factors of Piracy. Prepared by Author based on information from
Jiang & Lu (2020)

R-3 in this context, mentions that :
“Anti-piracy measures which are set out in the current BMPs almost exclusively require the
crew to set them up and without any crew on board AS would have to activate automatically, which
adds another layer of automatization”
According to IMB (2021), 195 piracy and armed robbery incidents were reported against ships
worldwide in 2020, higher than 2019 incidents, and included three hijacked vessels, 20 attempted
attacks, and 161 boarding by pirates.
There are real chances that modern pirate will change their tactics with this ultra-technological
change. If the pirates board the AS somehow, will they be able to take over the ship? There would
not be any accommodation, but there is still a kind of bridge and a “AI control room” and an engine
room. So, how will they access into the AS control room?.
According to R-6:
“To hijack the vessel by entering in its control system or network demand higher
knowledge on IT skills/ hacking capability which is less likely to possess by ordinary pirates or
hijackers.”
Whereas, R-8 had different opinion on this aspect who believe “There will always be some
point of access for a human to interact physically even on fully autonomous ship”
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R-7 believe that accessibility to AS will depend on degree of autonomy, and with proper preventive
measures and controls, there are ways for an AS to raise alarm in the event of security breach.
In August 2021, an attempt of potential hijacking of Panama flagged vessel Asphalt
Princess was reported in Gulf of Oman by the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
(UKMTO). The vessel was boarded by heavily armed men, but the crews prompt action in
disabling the engine prevented the incident. On the same day, 5-6 tankers in the region also
reported problems with their navigation equipment which led to the speculation of a possible
cyberattack on vessels in area (Maritime Executive, 2021). R-3 also anticipate higher risk of
terrorist attacks using the MASS as a weapon than conventional ships, especially in waters of
strategic and economic importance (Suez, Panama canal) or where, the risk of an environment
disaster is very high. Whereas, he thinks that intentional collision with warship is not very likely
due to higher alertness and maritime awareness44 on a warship than on merchant ships.
In same context, R-6 anticipates
“The situation is different in the case of maritime terrorism, in which ideologically and
politically driven non-state actors can recruit skilled IT personnel, and MASS can provide them
with a window to attack vulnerable targets. A terrorist organization can identify skilled individuals
among its cadre/sympathizers and hijack MASS without even sending their forces to do so.
Moreover, it will cut their preparation time and the chance of being discovered by security
personnel and law enforcement agencies, and they will be able to conduct an assault anywhere in
the world as per MASS operational reach”
The biggest concern that was raised by almost all experts was cyber-security or threats of
cyberpiracy as compared to physical pirate attacks citing the design features of an AS, which most
of them feel is impenetrable.
Cyber-attacks exploit communication network vulnerabilities, which jeopardise the integrity or
availability of data and ship control systems (Bolbot et al., 2019). AS will be vulnerable to cyberattacks, and the most serious risks may not be related to the ship or its cargo, but rather to the threat
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to infrastructure along the coast and offshore if the ship is under alien command. When traveling
at maximum speed, even relatively small AS have a significant kinetic energy and hence pose a
serious threat. A cyber-attack could be compared to the terrorist attack on the USS Cole, a guided
missile destroyer of the US Navy. 17 sailors were killed as a result of an attack by a tiny fibreglass
boat carrying explosives and two suicide bombers (Vinnem & Utne, 2018).
In survey almost 50% respondent strongly agreed and 38% agreed with SQ1145 (figure 17), making
cyberattacks as a major threat for AS.

Figure 17. Participant response to SQ 11 (prepared by Author)
According to R-6,
“Cyberattacks will be a strong possibility with the potential of gaining control of a MASS
for misuse.”
Whereas, R-1, considers :
“For cyber security, sufficient technology is existing, and only system has to be correctly
designed and subsequently proper crypto solutions to be used”
Another aspect which was highlighted is jamming and spoofing, which can be used by
criminals/non-state actors against these ships. According to R-1, jamming is one of the significant
concern other than cyber-security, which should be managed. R-2, however consider that jamming

45

MASS activities may be more vulnerable to cyber-attacks, including cyber piracy
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can still be managed with suitable AI software which can detect signal anomalies. But, spoofing
on the other hand can confuse AI to undertake undesired evasive maneuverers.
Further, hacking the AIS transmission would be 50% of the job to take control of the ship,
which are not easy to fix as well, and would take a considerable amount of time and money
(Eriksson & Gevriye, 2018). SMEs in Roberts et al., (2019) study anticipates issues with jammers
effects on heat or pressure or gas sensors onboards, which may lead to an explosion as well. And,
if the goal of the attacker is psychological impact, they would do it within a port or near the coast.
All in all, technology vulnerability will decide fate of these ships against security threats.
R-5 feels that : “systems overall needs to be resilient to withstand any form of attack”. Figure 18,
depicts a systematic diagram of hijack attack on AS with associated variable.

Figure 18. A systematic diagram of Hijack attack on AS. Adopted by Author based on
information from (Jiang & Lu, 2020; Tam & Jones, 2018b)

Mitigation measures
44

AS is being considered as potent solution against pirates, biggest proponent for this is the
likely design features of the ship. The unmanned state, invariably make it easier to recapture the
ship. In emergency, SCC can take evasive actions, seek assistance from law enforcement
authorities. However, there are still dilemmas associated with it. What if, pirates or hijackers set
ship on fire, then here would still be several serious consequences. Stopping a cyber-hijacked
vessel would also be difficult as it may act under alien command.
Design is the central factor to prevent any unauthorised element onboard these ships, which is
highlighted by maximum interviewees. R-3 speculate that MASS may be designed so that any
unauthorised person trying to take over a hijacked ship will not succeed due to the security regime
in place. Any prudent MASS operating shipping company will ensure a high state of access
control.
As discussed in the previous scenario, once a ship is hijacked through cyber means, sealing off AS
structure will probably not be a single solution, and local measures are needed to prevent misuse
of AS.
Like BMPs for conventional ships, R-1 and R-7 considers enhanced measures for AS, such as
motion detectors, heat sensors and additional barriers to detect and prevent physical attacks. R-1
also suggest implementation of better cooperation with local authorities. R-5 as well feels that,
there is a need to develop partnerships, establish cooperation in which various states and law
enforcement agencies should be involved in the development of AS. All states in a role of coastal
state should acquire capabilities to control a MASS.
R-9 considers that in the first place, AS should avoid passage through designated HRAs
and as protection measures, current methods46 as per BMPs may be employed. However,
autonomous fire defence system or use of firearms as an option may not be viable as it would not
be accepted by shipping owners and regulators.
A cyber-attack response and prevention plan based on vulnerability identification must be
maintained for cyber-security. To avert a hacker assault, IT and security specialists may need to
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conduct regular incident tests to detect weaknesses and upgrade the onboard security program (Li
& Fung, 2019).
Whereas, R-3 opined that
“Key concept is risk assessment, therefore, any mitigating measure will depend on identified
risks.” And also stresses on use of IMO approved guidelines47, recommendations48 for effective
cyber security.
R-4 was also skeptical in commenting on the actual solution until the ship actually starts
operating but adds that there will be a requirement for more through ISPS cyber guidelines that
relate to MASS.
4.6

Scenario - 3

Scenario-3 relates to an incident of armed robbery or petty theft onboard unmanned AS (figure
19). The AS, a small container ship is scheduled to enter a riverine feeder port in the high tide and
has been ordered by port control to drop anchor in the outer anchorage on arrival. While
maintaining at anchorage in the night, SCC crew observe several boats in the vicinity. Later, the
crew detects some unusual movement onboard ship, and immediately alerts the port authorities.
Consequently, a patrol vessel arrives on the scene, but is unable to locate any boat alongside AS
or in vicinity. On arrival at the port, the AS operator’s and port authority detects theft of some
valuable cargo and damage to several equipment.
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Figure 19.Scenario -3 “Armed robbery”
Analysis
Vulnerability of technology
It is very likely that many future attacks on maritime transport system will be multi-modal
including both a cyber and a physical component. Thus a cyber-attack can also become precursor
to a physical attack and vice versa (Roberts et al., 2019).
Armed robbery on ships is a contemporary challenge to shipping, and it has a global
influence on maritime trade and security. IMO’s Resolution A.1025 (26) “Code of practice for
the investigation of the crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships” defines armed robbery
(IMO, 2021a).
(a)

“Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other

than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or
property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial
sea”
(b)

“Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above”

Since the reward value is low, maritime robbery related crimes are opportunistic, occurring when
the vessel is at port or anchorages. In typical robbery cases, a few men with knives easily
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overpower the crew and take their belonging and ship’s items (Tumbarska, 2018). In response to
SQ 1549, a rather mix reaction was observed (figure 20).

Figure 20. Participants response for SQ15 (prepared by Author)
Dehart (2013) identified two types of pirate attacks in Southeast Asia. Small-scale attacks by
"opportunistic sea robbers" or "sea-faring hooligans" that occur while ships are at anchor. The
other being the major attacks for hijacking the ship. Experts also had varying opinion on this
aspect, and believe that crew absence may influence armed robbery and would depend on security
environment in which AS is operating. R-1 and R-2 consider that to some extent these threats may
increase marginally in comparison to normal conventional ships where crew and guard presence
may deter these incidents.
Moreover, Jin et al. (2019) described that vessels at berth or anchor are more vulnerable as most
attacks occur during such conditions, especially at night and in good weather. In addition, crew
actions against these attacks are some positive factors to deter the attacks.
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SQ 15 - The absence of crew may encourage criminals to undertake armed robbery/petty theft onboard MASS
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R-3 on IQ-550 as well, pointed that the ship is more susceptible to armed robbery when it is
stationary or drifting. Further, the vulnerability of a ship is more when it is outside the port as it is
harder to employ shore services.
According to Roberts et al. (2019), the criminals can hack into a cargo management system and
identify valuable cargo locations on a ship. It may enable them to make a very short and efficient
raid on a vessel, going right to the container of interest. The cyber attacker can even influence the
loading of containers so that those of interest are placed to be accessible.
According to R-2, it would be a major challenge for port authorities and law enforcement agencies.
Whereas as per R-5, there would be possibilities of such incidents. However, it will be less and
will be determined by the coastal state's maritime security measures and security situation in such
locations. If the coastal state's law enforcement is inadequate, occurrences like piracy, armed
robbery, and burglary will continue to occur. R-2, R-4 and R-7 have different views than other
experts, and they consider that due to difficult access, probability of such incidents might be quite
low.
Mitigation measures
IMO resolutions, circulars and guidelines over the years aimed to prevent and suppress armed
robbery against ships. In addition, IMO acknowledges that positioning of privately contracted
armed security personnel (PCASP) has become an accepted industry. However, IMO still stresses
on other protective measures including BMPs.
In case of AS, other suitable means would be employed to suitably secure maritime security.
AS security will heavily depend on technology and cooperation.
R-2 mentions to IQ-651, “Access to ship should be made difficult”. According to R-1 and R-7, “AS
would be equipped with variety of surveillance equipment so that SCC can monitor the aspects.
With strict hardening measures implemented for surveillance (motion detectors, heat sensors) and
alarms, the breach can be detected easily and responded”.
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Would you consider a higher probability of MASS being boarded at anchorage or in ports by armed robbers?
What solutions, in your opinion, could prevent such possibilities and have adequate security of vessels?
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In the same context, Hoem et al. (2018) point out to drawbacks and limits of automation. AI or
programmed technology can only deal with simple, complicated situations, whereas shipping is
regarded as complex, with unforeseeable factors that need infinite solution space. Moreover, “The
dynamic maritime environment with sea, current, weather, topography, manned and autonomous
ships is such a complex environment and will for a very long time need a human to step in and
resolve problems out of the range of automation” (Hoem et al., 2018, p.423). This viewpoint also
brought forward by Kobylinski (2018), who feels that maritime situations are hardly predictable.
The unpredictable marine conditions can seriously impede the design of a serviceable surveillance
system and electronic measures onboard AS.
R-3 on the other hand opined that measures depends on the risks posed. Therefore, two fold
approach may be maintained by operator’s which include security measures which are quickly to
implement and equipment to use in case of a general higher risk of attack. The measures can be
implemented well in advance prior a MASS enters service on a particular route52. The second
layer would be to have a constant monitoring for dynamic threat. This could for example, mean a
MASS operator avoids a port call for which there is a security level 2 (avoiding the risk altogether).
The other dynamic measure would be the employment of PCASP where the port, coastal and flag
state permits.
R-6, firmly believes that “scarcity of sources” and “state’s interest” to implement measures may
influence these factors. R-5 and R-6 both considers law enforcement effectiveness as a major
proponent to address these issues.
Van Hooydonk (2014) and Wrobel (2017) as well pointed at the drawbacks of technology in terms
of situational awareness and reliable functioning of technical components. Notwithstanding port
security and other measures, the security of the AS will be purely managed by technological
means, whose vulnerability as well as security situation in area will decide numbers and severity
of these incidents onboard AS.

52

For example, a ship which is planned to transit the Red Sea, measures may be implemented in advance with latest
BMPs.
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4.7

Scenario - 4

Scenario-4 relates to an incident of stowaway onboard unmanned AS (figure 21). An ocean-going
AS is on a voyage to Europe. During routine visual inspection of the engine room, the OOsW in
SCC observe three person inside the engine room. On close examination of the situation, it
confirms that all three are looking desperate, agitated, and trying to escape from the engine room
to other compartments.

Figure 21. Scenario-4 “Stowaway onboard MASS”
Analysis
Vulnerability of technology
Stowaways are a hazard to maritime security and the shipping industry since they have the ability
to endanger ships and cargo, as well as disrupt shipping operations (Aguocha, 2018).
For AS, stowaways seems to be a major concern for most of the participants who were
interviewed. According to R-1, R-2 and R-7, this is one of the aspect which needs to be considered
strongly with AS, and R-1 consider it as a higher risk for MASS. However, considers that it may
be a liability issue for the ship owner rather than a security hazard. R-7 expect the stowaway issues
to be bigger threat than piracy. In contrast, R-5 and R-6 think other way round. One thought that
R-6 shared.
“The lack of crew onboard MASS, creates a difficult/unfavourable situation for stowaways
because there will be fewer or no life-supporting systems onboard. Furthermore, after loading or
unloading the cargo, these ships can be sealed off, and all entry points can be closed. Access points
can also be monitored remotely at the same time. However, the expert believes that stowaway (s)
can sneak into a MASS with the assistance of shore-based workers and stringent access control to
the harbour facilities, including MASS, is the only viable solution”
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R-4 opines that the chances of stowaway getting onboard are low as MASS is anticipated
to maintain the highest ISPS code requirements. However, searches must be continued as the
present system for stowaways before departure.
As discussed in scenario 3, technology and automation has its own limitations. Moreover, majority
of ISPS complied ports are served with high end surveillance systems to detect presence of
unwanted or unauthorised person in port facilities. In addition, physical security measures are also
seemingly integrated with electronic surveillance systems in these ports. Despite strict measures
in ports around the world, stowaways somehow finds their way onboard ships.
Certainly, stowaways are capable of creating major security hazards. In Oct 2020, an incident
involving 07 stowaways onboard MT Nave Andromeda created a major security fiasco in UK
waters, and local police, coast guard and navy had to respond to control the situation. It was a
major security concern that British special forces (16 member boarding team) were tasked with
securing the ship and detaining several violent stowaways (Maritime Executive, 2020).
Stowaways may pose a risk to the ship as well. In United Brands Co. v M. V. Isla Plaza, stowaways
destroyed the ship by lighting a fire. In another case, In American Home Assurance Co. v Sletter
M/V, the entire food-based cargo was tainted by stowaways urine and faeces, and the cargo had to
be destroyed, resulting in a significant financial loss for the cargo interests. Cargo risks are not
always physical, they can arise as a result of a long voyage in which the ship diverges to disembark
stowaways (Aguocha, 2018).
The examples mentioned in conventional ships above are also anticipated in AS view the
infiltration can still happen through cargo from ports, at anchorages or while underway view
human instinct to escape their squalid living conditions. Assuming a AS laden with dangerous
cargo, serious damage to environment and human may also be caused. In survey, just less than a
quarter strongly agree, 38% agree whereas 7% strongly disagree and 16% strongly disagreed, with
the SQ1653 statement (figure 22).
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There is a significant probability that stowaway will target MASS more than regular ships
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Figure 22. Participant response to SQ 16 (prepared by Author)
Under ISPS, security level-1, provision is made for control of access to ships54, control of
embarkation of persons and their effects55, and monitoring of restricted areas to ensure that they
are accessed only by authorised personnel56. The presence of stowaways on ships is a breach of
the Ship Security Plan (SSP) and a clear violation of the ISPS Code. Despite ISPS measures, the
stowaways persistently manage to board ships using ingenious techniques (Aguocha, 2018). R-3
also highlights this as a problem of unauthorised access to ports and port failures to prevent
unauthorised people to enter port facilities. However, maximum stowaways cases are observed in
African continent where operation of MASS is less likely.
For AS, R-2 believe that,
“The problem will continue to exist because even though the ships are designed to prevent
ingress, people may sneak into containers, lorries or through other means”
Stowaways have their preferences57 and mostly target vessels which make short trips, have short
transit period and operate at high speed (Aguocha, 2018).

54

Section 7.2.2

55

Section 7.2.3

56

Section 7.2.4

57

Ro-Ro cargo ships, followed by ferries, containerships and general cargo ships

53

R-6, for IQ758, mention
“AS will be slower and have a longer journey period, requiring the stowaway to carry more
provisions (s).” And contemplate that stowaway probably would not target these ships due to
longer travel period.
Mitigation measures
Most stowaway incidents are organised activities by local or international human or drug
trafficking groups. In some cases, port security may also be involved in the racket (Aguocha,
2018).
In order to avoid stowaways incidents onboard AS, According to R-7,
“There would be certain natural defence such as lack of gangway, restricted or no access,
still stowaway can enter the ship with various other means. Therefore, there is a greater need for
shifting focus from the ship side to the port due to absence of crew. The port would be required to
strengthen their security measures specially on those terminals where these ships will be berthed”
R-5 also highlights the importance of port and law enforcement:
“Implementation of a pre-departure check could ensure the safety of the vessel from any
unneeded objects or personnel (stowaways). These procedures could be implemented in
collaboration with a MASS operator by port state authorities (PSC)”
In response to SQ2259, majority of participants polled in favour of compulsory security checks
prior leaving a port, which can be initiated by the MASS operator, and ensured by the port authority
under their AS departure check list (figure 23).
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In your opinion, to what extent non-presence of the crew may render MASS a soft target for stowaways?
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MASS security clearance including nil stowaway must be made compulsory prior leaving a port
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Figure 23.Participant response SQ 22 (prepared by Author)
In addition, port may also have to re-evaluate their port security assessment under ISPS code for
AS terminals.
4.8

Scenario – 5

Scenario-5 relates to an incident of an unmanned AS carrying illicit material in cargo (figure 24).
The law enforcement agency in a coastal state gets an input regarding the AS carrying a large
shipment of drugs. Consequently, a law enforcement vessel proceeds to the location of the ship to
investigate. However, fails to communicate with the AS’s SCC. A VBSS team is launched to board
and inspect the AS on existing suspicion and inputs.

Figure 24. Scenario-5 “AS involved in transnational organized crime”
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Analysis
Vulnerability of technology
The use of AS for illegal objectives, particularly smuggling commodities, is one of the new
technologies that has international law implications. The criminals may also turn to AS to further
their operation in different ways, and small AS may be used to transport good illicitly.
The interviewees state their concern. However, has varying opinions on the subject.
R-1 in response to IQ1060,
“Due to design features, autonomous unmanned ship would not be a viable option for such
transnational organised crimes and probably it is easier to do that with a conventional manned
vessel than an autonomous vessel. Further, with appropriate surveillance, it would be difficult to
do that. But, it as an open question and hence difficult to judge at the moment”
Again, like stowaways, drug traffickers are found to be extremely ingenuous. Moreover, they will
not be having scarcity of money unlike stowaways. They are likely to find several ways and means
to hide big consignment of illicit materials and will also escape jurisdictional purview of any state.
McLaughlin & Klein (2021) highlighted the practical nuances in apprehending the culprits in such
cases.
R-7 mentions, “MASS may change the pattern of criminal activities, the current practices61 will
however depend on level of port facility security.” In addition, R-8, raised issue of accessibility
by port workers and said, “The other factor which is likely to influence is how AS is going to be
berthed as a vessel can be accessed by the port personnel including stevedores.”
According to (McLaughlin & Klein, 2021) two possibilities contemplated in use of AS to further
drug-trafficking operations, first the small submersibles or semi-submersibles (currently in use)
altered for autonomous operation, which may or may not be registered to a particular flag. The
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Do you think there are high possibilities of MASS being used by criminals for transnational organized crimes?
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Exploitation of human element (through stevedores, contractors, and by involving crew members) and other using
covert divers to attach waterproof packages of drug to hull surface.
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other case, is use of usual cargo AS being used for drug trafficking, which is transporting
containers, may also has illicit cargo on board.
R-2 and R-5, hold similar opinion about use of AS for drug trafficking including usage of
containers. R-5 further consider potential abuse of AS,
“MASS can be used for such purposes including transportation of WMD or can be used like
a bomb when it is controlled by unnecessary entities who may use it for disturbing economic
activities of some coastal state”
In response to SQ 1462, a rather mix reaction was observed (figure 25).

Figure 25.Participant response SQ 14 (prepared by Author)
R-4 also envisages this as an excellent opportunity for drug smugglers since no one can get
captured, and criminals can transport drugs anonymously. R- 6 in this context believes that :
“It may be difficult to use MASS in commercial shipping as a platform. Nevertheless,
culprits can use their own automated, autonomous craft for such activity.”
R-3 contemplates it to be a matter of enforcement, willingness and capabilities of port, coastal,
and flag state to prevent criminal activity. The absence of crew including master may however
raise other concerns including that of liabilities.
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SQ 14 - Autonomous (crewless) ships, in comparison to conventional ships, would become a preferred choice for
criminals to undertake transnational organized crimes (arms/drugs/human trafficking)
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The LEA while proceeding for interdiction of drug smuggling AS, may have to deal with both
legal and technical challenges. In first instance, LEA have to secure concurrence of flag state (if
registered), deal with jurisdictional issues63 (McLaughlin & Klein, 2021). Allen (2018) has also
observed the crucial nature of VBSS operation in the case of AS. He raises a valid question “how
to conduct a boarding when there is no master or crew to answer questions regarding the craft’s
nationality, to manoeuvre the craft to accommodate the boarding, or to present the necessary
documents once a team is on board” (p.491).
Mitigation measures
All participants considers greater role of port security. R-7 consider that the current trends of
exploiting human element or covertly attaching waterproof packets to underwater hull can be
checked through effective port facility security, and expect a paradigm shift in responsibility of
LEA and the concerned port authorities .
“A shift in security strategy is expected and agencies may have to strengthen their
infrastructure within port facilities and adapt according to changing environment based on the
operation of these ships”
R-4 also consider security and checks prior to departure is important for MASS.
Law enforcement at sea will also be affected accordingly. If a vessel carrying illicit material
need to be boarded outside territorial waters (TW), there would be an expectation of taking prior
authorisation from flag state to board the ship. Within, TW, consent would not be essential to take
action against foreign flag AS in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction under article 27 of LOSC.
However, in each case, LEA is to wrest control of the vessel and technological intervention
(McLaughlin & Klein, 2021).
R-2 shared his perception on control of AS:
“As a matter of fact, the law enforcement agencies would always like to have certain override
control mechanism wherein they can control MASS to probably stop, manoeuvres, heave to in a
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“Extra-territorial reach of the relevant drug-trafficking offences as incorporated in State’s national law”, legal
issues in exercising control of AS.
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position to undertake boarding.” R-2 anticipates some form of control, based on radio line of sight
which can be used by different agencies including pilots during berthing of ships. However,
foresees legal, responsibility issues during such control as ship owner may be reluctant to involve
other agencies with AS operation. This may however be exploited by culprits as well. R-4 also
acknowledges that LEA can access the ship in a similar way as pilots in ports.
Once AS start operating in the international waters, the issues of law enforcement and
inspection will come up, and AS operators have to allow LEA inspection teams to even board in
some cases prior making port call to check and prevent security threats. On this aspect R-1 predicts
that international MASS traffic is expected, which may be based on mutual bilateral agreement
between the flag states and coastal state, and these agreements would probably regulate the
inspections regime onboard AS. The flag state in such cases have to provide enough assurance
about security measures to the coastal states. The use of VBSS or boarding will also restrict view
nil crew onboard MASS, and this may further pose higher risk for boarding teams as these ships
are not constructed for such operations. However, this requires implementation of other types of
regulations to avoid need for boarding in open waters.
R-8 anticipate:
“There could be some kind of digital passport for these ships, which might obviate need of
boarding of AS. However, I still believe the physical inspections will take place”
High level of coordination is expected during MASS operation, between flag state, respective
coastal state and AS operator. LEA may have to maintain sufficient readiness to deal with MASS
security contingencies, if any.
R-5 suggest that a common infrastructure for operation of AS would be essential for better
cooperation. Further, anticipate that “VBSS would not be possible and essential as far as CS would
be cooperating with MASS operator.”
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The LOSC anticipates that States may exercise jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels on
the high seas consistent with either the right of visit64, or the right of hot pursuit65. Each of these
rights is tightly circumscribed in deference to exclusive flag State jurisdiction (Fink, 2018; Kraska
& Pedrozo, 2013).
During any VBSS, which either complied or non-complied has certain procedures and even a
simple boarding operation, can go wrong under hostile conditions. A boarding team, having
suspicion on a AS, may have to proceed with utmost caution. R-2 state:
“Practical challenges will be experienced by law enforcement agencies including
communication issues with SCC operators during such operations”
R-3 believe that any armed intervention onboard AS would not take a risk as far as human life on
board the ship itself is concerned. Overall, R-3 don’t foresee any adverse impacts on maritime
security and law enforcement but expect change in measures for MASS operators and port
receiving MASS. Also, LEA dealing with any crewless ships, new procedures and protocols will
need to be developed by IMO and national administrations to ensure ships operate under a legal
framework.
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Article 110
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Article 111
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Chapter 5 – Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1

Introduction

This chapter summarises the study's findings of the implications of MASS on maritime security
and law enforcement in form of conclusion. Accordingly, recommendations are suggested for
effective management of maritime security in MASS era. Finally, the limits of the study and the
scope of future research are covered.
5.2

Conclusion

From analysis and data processing, the conclusion for RQs is as follows:
RQ-1: What are the likely impacts of autonomous unmanned ship on maritime security and what
mitigation measures should be adopted to address these impacts?
The result indicated that there will be visible impacts of AS on maritime security. The present day
conventional piracy may see a downward trend due to anticipated structural design of MASS and
also due to less technical expertise of traditional pirates as well as low bargaining capacity to
secure financial gains. However, this cannot be completely predicted. Moreover, initially, AS will
be used only in Europe, northern America and few parts in Asia. However, the risk cannot be
completely zero, and there may be attempts by pirates to embark AS. Cyber threats on the other
hand will become major risk for the maritime security through AS which need to be managed
effectively to prevent severe consequences. Opportunity may be explored by non-state actors,
terrorists by hiring technically superior persons to launch attacks and disrupt trade. The criminals
may use jammers to disrupt GNSS signals, which may require considerations. However, system
or AI can be developed which can detect such anomalies. Cyber attackers may also use spoofing
techniques to confuse the AS, where AI may undertake actions which may also result in security
hazard.
The threats of armed robbery or petty theft may be higher onboard AS due to absence of
crew. Similarly, the exploitation of AS by stowaways is considered to be a bigger threat which
need to be dealt appropriately. The use of AS for transnational organised crimes would remain
relatively same as criminals may continue to use other means to embark drugs or illicit items in
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containers and hiding it in cargo. However, the unmanned state of ship will prevent criminals to
approach crew and exploit human element to undertake the same. On the contrary, human error or
involvement may still persist since AS will be embarked by port personals and workers who can
embark these illicit items onboard AS. On a higher scale, criminals may employ or operate
independent AS to undertake their activity.
The other major aspects that emerged out of AS is SCCs, which are considered to be a vulnerable
target, and will need special attention from both physical as well as cyber security. SCC will
influence future maritime domain. Any form of infiltration means the infiltrator has direct access
to the AS being operated from the centre. SCC communication infrastructure as well can be
targeted by the hackers. Further, the human element would shift from ship to shore and may still
influence security aspects.
Despite all concerns, there are chances that overall maritime security may improve as MASS
would be relatively complex with expensive systems, and only serious owners and operators with
more considerations to security will invest in such ships.
The mitigation strategy to address AS impacts on maritime security may involve high level
of coordination and cooperation between involved stakeholders including flag states, coastal states,
SCCs, the ship owners, operators, the port facilities, or the law enforcement. It is critical to
understand what kind of remote craft is being operated and a uniform coordinated approach is
adopted to assess the security.
Overall, the inclusive measures including onsite surveillance (motion detectors, sensors,
camera and alarms), difficult or impenetrable access, would act as mitigation measure to detect
and prevent any infiltration. Further, the responsibility will shift from seafarers to shore authorities.
Therefore, effective maritime security and law enforcement by port authorities, coastal states and
law enforcement agencies will be essential to prevent incidents onboard AS.
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RQ-2: What are the challenges anticipated by maritime law enforcement agencies in the
autonomous shipping, and how should these challenges be addressed?
The analysis of literature, survey as well as opinions of experts clearly points out towards enhanced
role of law enforcement agencies in ensuring security of MASS in their coastal waters and deal
with the implications of MASS operation on maritime security. It is estimated that MASS will
introduce new challenges for the coastal states, port authorities, and law enforcement agencies in
managing maritime security within their operational areas. Therefore, clear shift in responsibility
will be seen in future where role of even SCCs crew would be restricted due to poor situational
awareness. Considerable requirement may also exist to upgrade the technological competency
onboard law enforcement platforms (ships) to interact (handle) or in some cases control these
vessels. As mentioned by experts, there would be a paradigm shift how security of these ships and
maritime security will be managed in future. The conduct of VBSS operations will also be affected,
and by and large would be difficult to undertake onboard MASS due to access constraint, absence
of crew and liability issues. However, at times, these requirements need to be fulfilled where
suspicion exist that the ship is being used in illicit activity for which procedures and protocols need
to be formulated. Alternate arrangement in form of bilateral agreements shall be undertaken with
states employing MASS which also involves other coastal states. Therefore, there will be clear
need for agencies to promote high level of cooperation and coordination with various stakeholders.
5.3

Recommendations

Following recommendations are suggested to effectively manage maritime security threats, and
strengthen law enforcement in autonomous ship(s) era :
- A high level of participation from regulatory bodies, member states (element of law enforcement
agencies), and the MASS developers is needed to develop global strategy to facilitate MASS
operations. Research efforts may be directed for establishing potential gaps to make AS operations
secure and resilient against man made threats.
- A careful look is needed by the MASS developers to construct ships to prevent maritime security
incidents while keeping law enforcement perspective in mind. In order to have a situation where a
risk is maintained as low as possible, strict access control, effective surveillance techniques, higher
grade of cyber security solutions needs to be used, which needs to be regularly upgraded.
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- Enhancement of port security measures including security risk assessment should be undertaken
by those ports which are planning to operate AS.

- IMO, and other member states must impose regulations to mitigate new security risks so that
unmanned shipping gains the trust of the maritime transport industry.
- SCC emerging out to be a critical component needs to be protected with stringent measures from
both physical as well as cyber angle. Also, redundancy is to be maintained for each SCC.

5.4

Limitations and future research

Indeed, there are limitations of this research, which signifies that suggestions for future study can
be made. In the absence of historical data or significant research in this area, AS exact implications
on shipping maritime security and law enforcement may not be effectively quantified. Moreover,
the concept of AS is vast and expanding rapidly. Its impact on maritime security found in this
study can only be a jigsaw piece of a much larger puzzle.
In future, research efforts may be directed towards a specific scenario. In particular, MASS
operators may have to conduct a security risk assessment for autonomous ships and SCCs
employing the requisite tool since these centres will now significantly influence the maritime
domain. The other significant aspect is the redundancy of SCCs and the feasibility of local controls
with law enforcement agencies or coastal state(s) to manage exigencies at sea. Nevertheless, these
steps are not simple and need thorough investigation and deliberations by each stakeholder.

64

Reference
Aguocha, N. M. (2018). No title. Stowaways: A Threat to Maritime Security and the Curse of Shipowners.,
Allen, C. H. (2018). Determining the legal status of unmanned maritime vehicles: formalism vs
functionalism. J.Mar.L.& Com., 49, 477.
Allianz. (2021). Safety and Shipping. Review 2021.
Amer, M., Daim, T. U., & Jetter, A. (2013). A review of scenario planning. Futures, 46, 23-40.
Andrew, S., & Halcomb, E. J. (2012). Mixed methods research. Navigating the Maze of Research:
Enhancing Nursing and Midwifery Practice, , 147-166.
Andritsos, F. (2013). EU port security & growth. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 8th Future
Security Research Conference, 267-274.
Attard, F. (2014). IMO's contribution to international law regulating maritime security. J.Mar.L.& Com.,
45, 479.
Bolbot, V., Theotokatos, G., Boulougouris, E., & Vassalos, D. (2019). Safety related cyber-attacks
identification and assessment for autonomous inland ships. Paper presented at the International
Seminar on Safety and Security of Autonomous Vessels (ISSAV),
Bueger, C. (2015). What is maritime security? Marine Policy, 53, 159-164.
Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2017). Beyond seablindness: a new agenda for maritime security studies.
International Affairs, 93(6), 1293-1311.
Bueger, C., Edmunds, T., & McCabe, R. (2020). Into the sea: capacity-building innovations and the
maritime security challenge. Third World Quarterly, 41(2), 228-246.
Carey, L. (2017). All hands off deck? The legal barriers to autonomous ships.
Chang, C., Kontovas, C., Yu, Q., & Yang, Z. (2021). Risk assessment of the operations of maritime
autonomous surface ships. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 207, 107324.
Coito, J. (2021). Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships: New Possibilities—and Challenges—in Ocean Law
and Policy. International Law Studies, 97(1), 19.
Cook, P. (2020). Comment: The emerging spectrum of maritime security. International Journal of Maritime
Crime & Security (IJMCS), 1(1), 30-55.
Creswell, J. W. (2021). A concise introduction to mixed methods research. SAGE publications.
Dehart, J., 2013. Pirates of the Southeast Asian Seas. Neptune P2P
Group. https://thediplomat.com/2013/07/pirates-of-the-southeast-asian-seas/.
de Klerk, Y., Manuel, M. E., & Kitada, M. (2021). Scenario planning for an autonomous future: A
comparative analysis of national preparedness of selected countries. Marine Policy, 127, 104428.

65

Emad, G. R., Khabir, M., & Shahbakhsh, M. (2020). Shipping 4.0 and training seafarers for the future
autonomous and unmanned ships. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 21th Marine Industries
Conference (MIC2019), Qeshm Island, Iran, 1-2.
Eriksson, A., & Gevriye, S. (2018). The biggest challenges with autonomous costal ferries.
Fan, C., Wróbel, K., Montewka, J., Gil, M., Wan, C., & Zhang, D. (2020). A framework to identify factors
influencing navigational risk for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships. Ocean Engineering, 202,
107188.
Felski, A., & Zwolak, K. (2020). The ocean-going autonomous ship—Challenges and threats. Journal of
Marine Science and Engineering, 8(1), 41.
Fink, M. (2018). Maritime interception and the law of naval operations: A study of legal bases and legal
regimes in maritime interception operations. Springer.
Galani, S., & Evans, M. D. (2020). The interplay between maritime security and the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea: help or hindrance? Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea ().
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Guerra, S. (2017). Ready about, Here Comes AI: Potential Maritime Law Challenges for Autonomous
Shipping. USF Mar.LJ, 30, 69.
Guilfoyle, D. (2017). Maritime Law Enforcement Operations and Intelligence in an Age of Maritime
Security.
Habdank, J. (2019). No title. Exploring the Barriers and Opportunities of the Trend Towards Autonomous
Shipping,
Halcomb, E. J., & Hickman, L. (2015). Mixed methods research.
Heikkilä, E. (2018). AI for Autonomous Ships: Challenges in Design and Validation. Paper presented at
the International Seminar on Safety and Security of Autonomous Vessels, ISSAV 2018,
Herbert-Burns, R., Bateman, S., & Lehr, P. (2019). Lloyd's MIU handbook of maritime security. Auerbach
Publications.
Honekamp, W. (2018). Electronic navigation challenges for autonomous ships. Mobility in a Globalised
World 2017, 19, 211.
Im, I., Shin, D., & Jeong, J. (2018). Components for smart autonomous ship architecture based on intelligent
information technology. Procedia Computer Science, 134, 91-98.
IMB. (2021). Piracy and Armed Against Ships. https://www.iccccs.org/reports/2020_Annual_Piracy_Report.pdf
IMO. (2017). Maritime cyber risk. https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/Cyber-security.aspx
IMO. (2018). Working group report in 100th session of IMO Maritime Safety Committee for the regulatory
scoping exercise for the use of maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS). MARITIME SAFETY
COMMITTEE 100th session MSC 100/ WP.8. ().
IMO.
(2021a).
The
International
Ship
and
Port
Facility
(ISPS)
https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx

Code.

66

IMO.
(2021b).
OUTCOME
OF
THE
REGULATORY
SCOPING
EXERCISE
FOR THE USE OF MARITIME AUTONOMOUS SURFACE SHIPS (MASS) . (). MSC.1/Circ.1638
Jiang, M., & Lu, J. (2020a). The analysis of maritime piracy occurred in Southeast Asia by using Bayesian
network. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 139, 101965.
Jiang, M., & Lu, J. (2020b). The analysis of maritime piracy occurred in Southeast Asia by using Bayesian
network. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 139, 101965.
Jin, M., Shi, W., Lin, K., & Li, K. X. (2019). Marine piracy prediction and prevention: Policy implications.
Marine Policy, 108, 103528.
Johnson, R. B., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time
has come. Educational Researcher, 33(7), 14-26.
Jones, S. (2006). Maritime security: a practical guide. Nautical Institute.
Kavallieratos, G., Diamantopoulou, V., & Katsikas, S. K. (2020). Shipping 4.0: Security requirements for
the cyber-enabled ship. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 16(10), 6617-6625.
Kim, M., Joung, T., Jeong, B., & Park, H. (2020a). Autonomous shipping and its impact on regulations,
technologies, and industries. Journal of International Maritime Safety, Environmental Affairs, and
Shipping, 4(2), 17-25.
Kim, M., Joung, T., Jeong, B., & Park, H. (2020b). Autonomous shipping and its impact on regulations,
technologies, and industries. Journal of International Maritime Safety, Environmental Affairs, and
Shipping, 4(2), 17-25.
Kim, T., & Mallam, S. (2020). A Delphi-AHP study on STCW leadership competence in the age of
autonomous maritime operations. WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 19, 163-181.
Kim, Y., & Cha, S. (2012). Threat scenario‐based security risk analysis using use case modeling in
information systems. Security and Communication Networks, 5(3), 293-300.
Klein, N. (2011). Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea. Oxford University Press.
Klein, N. (2019). Maritime Autonomous Vehicles within the International Law Framework to Enhance
Maritime Security. International Law Studies, 95(1), 8.
Klein, N., Guilfoyle, D., Karim, M. S., & McLaughlin, R. (2020). Maritime autonomous vehicles: New
frontiers in the law of the sea. International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 69(3), 719-734.
Kobyliński, L. (2018). Smart ships–autonomous or remote controlled? Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej
W Szczecinie,
Komianos, A. (2018). The autonomous shipping era. operational, regulatory, and quality challenges.
TransNav: International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, 12(2)
Kraska, J. (2010). Broken Taillight at Sea: The Peacetime International Law of Visit, Board, Search, and
Seizure. Ocean & Coastal LJ, 16, 1.
Kraska, J., & Pedrozo, R. (2013). International maritime security law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

67

Kretschmann, L., Burmeister, H., & Jahn, C. (2017). Analyzing the economic benefit of unmanned
autonomous ships: An exploratory cost-comparison between an autonomous and a conventional bulk
carrier. Research in Transportation Business & Management, 25, 76-86.
Kumar, R. (2018). Research methodology: A step-by-step guide for beginners. Sage.
Kunz, M., & Ó hÉigeartaigh, S. (2020). Artificial Intelligence and Robotization. Artificial Intelligence and
Robotization.Robin Geiß and Nils Melzer (Eds.), Oxford Handbook on the International Law of Global
Security (Oxford University Press, Forthcoming),
Kutsuna, K., Ando, H., Nakashima, T., Kuwahara, S., & Nakamura, S. (2019). NYK’s approach for
autonomous navigation–structure of action planning system and demonstration experiments. Paper
presented at the Journal of Physics: Conference Series, , 1357(1) 012013.
Leuprecht, C., Aulthouse, A., & Walther, O. (2016). The puzzling resilience of transnational organized
criminal networks. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 376-387.
Li, S., & Fung, K. S. (2019). Maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS): implementation and legal issues.
Maritime Business Review,
Liwång, H. (2016). Conditions for a risk-based naval ship survivability approach: a study on fire risk
analysis. Naval Engineers Journal, 128(3), 87-101.
Maritime Executive. (2020, October,). SBS Boarding Team Detains Stowaways After Confrontation
Aboard Tanker. https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/sbs-boarding-team-detains-stowawaysafter-confrontation-aboard-tanker
Maritime Executive. (2021). UK Warns of Potential Hijacking of Tanker Off Oman. https://maritimeexecutive.com/article/uk-warns-of-potential-hijacking-by-iran-of-tanker-off-oman
McLaughlin, R., & Klein, N. (2021). Maritime Autonomous Vehicles and Drug Trafficking by Sea: Some
Legal Issues. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 36(3), 389-418.
Metaparti, P. (2010). Rhetoric, rationality and reality in post-9/11 maritime security. Maritime Policy &
Management, 37(7), 723-736.
Munim, Z. H. (2019). Autonomous ships: a review, innovative applications and future maritime business
models. Paper presented at the Supply Chain Forum: An International Journal, , 20(4) 266-279.
Osinuga, D. (2020). Unmanned ships: Coping in the murky waters of traditional maritime law. Poredbeno
Pomorsko Pravo, 59(174), 75-105.
Petrig, A. (2020). The commission of maritime crimes with unmanned systems: an interpretive challenge
for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea
(). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Porathe, T., J. Prison, and Y. Man (2014). Situation Awareness in Remote Control Centres for
Unmanned Ships. Paper presented at the Proceedings of Human Factors in Ship Design &
Operation, 26-27 February 2014, London, UK.
Porathe, T., Hoem, Å, Rødseth, Ø, Fjørtoft, K., & Johnsen, S. O. (2018). At least as safe as manned
shipping? Autonomous shipping, safety and “human error”. Safety and Reliability–Safe Societies in a
Changing World (pp. 417-425). CRC Press.

68

Ramírez, B., & Bunker, R. J. (2015). Narco-submarines. Specially fabricated vessels used for drug
smuggling purposes.
Roberts, F. S., Egan, D., Nelson, C., & Whytlaw, R. (2019). Combined cyber and physical attacks on the
maritime transportation system. NMIOTC Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal, 18
Rødseth, Ø J., & Nordahl, H. (2017). No title. Definition for Autonomous Merchant Ships.Version 1.0,
October 10.2017.Norwegian Forum for Autonomous Ships,
Rødseth, Ø J. (2018). Assessing business cases for autonomous and unmanned ships. Technology and
Science for the Ships of the Future (pp. 1033-1041). IOS Press.
Rødseth, Ø J., & Burmeister, H. (2015). Risk assessment for an unmanned merchant ship. TransNav:
International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, 9(3), 357-364.
Rødseth, Ø J., Wennersberg, L. A. L., & Nordahl, H. (2021). Towards approval of autonomous ship systems
by their operational envelope. Journal of Marine Science and Technology, , 1-10.
Rylander, R., & Man, Y. (2016). Autonomous safety on vessels. Lighthouse Swedish Maritime Competence
Centre,
Saha, R. (2021). Mapping competence requirements for future shore control center operators. Maritime
Policy & Management, , 1-13.
Sakhi, F. E., ALLAL, A. A., MANSOURI, K., & QBADOU, M. (2019). Determination of merchant ships
that most likely to be autonomously operated. Paper presented at the 2019 1st International
Conference on Smart Systems and Data Science (ICSSD), 1-5.
Schoonenboom, J., & Johnson, R. B. (2017). How to construct a mixed methods research design. KZfSS
Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie, 69(2), 107-131.
Şenol, Y., GÖKÇEK, V., & SEYHAN, A. (2017). SWOT-AHP Analysis of Autonomous Shipping. Paper
presented at the 4th International Multidisciplinary Congress of Eurasia Proceedings, , 2 58-69.
Star, J., Rowland, E. L., Black, M. E., Enquist, C. A., Garfin, G., Hoffman, C. H., Hartmann, H., Jacobs,
K. L., Moss, R. H., & Waple, A. M. (2016). Supporting adaptation decisions through scenario
planning: Enabling the effective use of multiple methods. Climate Risk Management, 13, 88-94.
Szelangiewicz, T., & Żelazny, K. (2020). Unmanned ships–maritime transport of the 21st century. Zeszyty
Naukowe Akademii Morskiej W Szczecinie,
Tam, K., & Jones, K. (2018). Cyber-risk assessment for autonomous ships. Paper presented at the 2018
International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security), 1-8.
Trump, B. D. (2020). Security and Resilience for a 4.0 Ship. Cybersecurity and Resilience in the Arctic,
58, 92.
Tumbarska, A. (2018). Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery Evolution in 2008-2017. Security & Future,
2(1), 18-21.
UNCTAD. (2018). Review of maritime transport. Geneva: UNCTAD Secretariat. Geneva‐New York.,
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2018_en.pdf

69

UNCTAD. (2020). Review of maritime transport.(Geneva: UNCTAD secretariat. Geneva‐New York.)
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2020_en.pdf
Van Hooydonk, E. (2014). The law of unmanned merchant shipping–an exploration. The Journal of
International Maritime Law, 20(3), 403-423.
Verschuren, P., Doorewaard, H., & Mellion, M. (2010). Designing a research project. Eleven International
Publishing The Hague.
Vinnem, J. E., & Utne, I. B. (2018). Risk from cyberattacks on autonomous ships. Safety and ReliabilitySafe Societies in a Changing World,
Wariishi, K. (2019). Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships: Development Trends and Prospects-how
Digitalization Drives Changes in Maritime Industry. Mitsui & Co.Global Strategic Studies Institute,
Wróbel, K., Gil, M., & Montewka, J. (2020). Identifying research directions of a remotely-controlled
merchant ship by revisiting her system-theoretic safety control structure. Safety Science, 129, 104797.
Zhou, X., Liu, Z., Wang, F., & Wu, Z. (2021). A system-theoretic approach to safety and security coanalysis of autonomous ships. Ocean Engineering, 222, 108569.
Zhou, X., WU, Z., WANG, F., & LIU, Z. (2019). Definition of autonomous ship and its autonomy level.
Jiaotong Yunshu Gongcheng Xuebao/Journal of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, 19, 149-162.

70

Appendix-A

71

Appendix-B

72

Interview Questions

Personnel information
Name of participant

:

Company or institution

:

Position

:

Year of experience

:

The questions to be asked to participants will be selected from the following list:
1.
Do you think there are high possibilities of MASS being hijacked by pirates (physical or cyber) to
ask for ransom for cargo/ launch attacks on vulnerable assets or port installations (collision with
warships/grounding in navigable areas)?
2.

Do you also consider any possibility of abuse of GNSS or AIS data onboard these ships?

3.

Do you consider cyber security threats to be higher than physical pirate threats, and why?

4.

What solutions, in your opinion, could prevent such possibilities of cyber and physical attacks?

5.
Would you consider a higher probability of MASS being boarded at anchorage or in ports by armed
robbers?
6.
What solutions, in your opinion, could prevent such possibilities and have adequate security of
vessels?
7.
In your opinion, to what extent non-presence of the crew may render MASS a soft target for
stowaways?
8.

What types of challenges or barriers do you see to prevent stowaway ingress onboard MASS?

9.

What solutions, in your opinion, could prevent such possibilities?

10. Do you think there are high possibilities of MASS being used by criminals for transnational
organized crimes?
11.

What challenges and barriers do you see to prevent such incidents or attacks?

12.

What solutions, in your opinion, could prevent such possibilities?

13. Is there any possibility that the shore control centres may also be attacked (cyber pirates or physical
attack) by criminals/non-state actors to fulfil their goals?
14.

What solutions, in your opinion, could prevent such possibilities?
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15. What measures do you consider for the security aspects of Shore Control Centers? Should these
centres be covered under the security umbrella of IMO regulations?
16.

Do you foresee any adverse impacts of MASS towards maritime security and law enforcement?

17. Do you feel any possible change in maritime interdiction/ boarding (VBSS) procedures involving
MASS?
18. What do you think, would be the biggest challenge to deal with such ships (autonomous and
unmanned) involved in any illicit crime (terrorism/ trafficking/ stowaway/ illegal immigrants)?
19. Do you anticipate any possible changes in security agencies methods/procedures while dealing with
such ships?
20.

What security initiatives should be considered from the planning stage (design phase) of MASS?
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Appendix-C
Survey Questionnaire
Dear participants
In this survey, I want to assess how the introduction of autonomous (crewless) or Maritime Autonomous
Surface Ships (MASS - Degrees of automation 3 & 4) in the maritime transport industry would affect maritime
security and law enforcement. This is part of my Master’s dissertation at the World Maritime University (WMU).
This questionnaire includes two sections, in which, the participant is invited to answer a range of questions, as
per the scale indicated. All the information obtained through the survey is anonymous. There will not be any
possibility to trace any answers to the individuals.
In order to optimise the quality of the survey, genuine and unbiased choices are requested from the participant.
It will take about 10 minutes to complete the form.
Thank you very much in advance for taking your precious time out to fill in the questionnaire!
Yours sincerely

Section – I
1. Gender
Male/Female/ Preferred not say
2. Age
Under 25 years / 25-35 years/ 36-45 years / 11-15 years / 46-55 years / Over 55 years
3. Job
Maritime Administration/ Maritime Academician / Maritime Expert / Seafarer /Navy / Coast Guard
4. Position
Top manager/ middle manager/ Senior officer/ Junior officer/ Master/ Chief officer/ Second officer/
Professor / Associate professor/ Assistant professor / others
5. Years of Experience
Less than 5 years/ 5-10 years/ 11-15 years/ 16-20 years / Over 20 years
6. Nationality
Section – II
7. How familiar are you with the concept of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship (MASS)
Not at all familiar/ Not so familiar / Somewhat familiar / Very familiar / Extremely familiar
8. How familiar are you with Maritime Security and its importance in maritime transport industry
Not at all familiar/ Not so familiar / Somewhat familiar / Very familiar / Extremely familiar
9. How familiar are you with the concept of law enforcement at sea
Not at all familiar/ Not so familiar / Somewhat familiar / Very familiar / Extremely familiar
10. Despite the absence of the crew, traditional piracy attacks will affect MASS.
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
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11. MASS activities may be more vulnerable to cyber-attacks, including cyber piracy
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
12. A deliberate denial of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) service or the use of
misleading signals to deceive the GNSS receiver may be fatal for MASS
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
13. There are chances that non-state actors will employ MASS as a weapon to attack sensitive targets
(warships, port or coastline installations etc.)
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
14. Autonomous (crewless) ships, in comparison to conventional ships, would become a preferred
choice for criminals to undertake transnational organised crimes (arms/drugs/human trafficking etc)
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
15. The absence of crew may encourage criminals to undertake armed robbery/petty theft onboard
MASS
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
16. There is a significant probability that stowaway will target MASS more than regular ships
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
17. There is a higher possibility that crewless autonomous ships may also pose a threat to the security
of other conventional ships
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
18. The absence of crew onboard MASS may weaken the ship's security under the ISPS code
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
19. Deputation of security crew onboard MASS will be essential to provide equivalent level of security
in ports
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
20. Deputation of security crew will be essential to provide equivalent level of security at anchorage
to avoid armed robberies/petty thefts
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
21. Ports that would handle MASS may have to re-evaluate their port security assessment under ISPS
code
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
22. MASS security clearance including nil stowaway must be made compulsory prior leaving a port
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
23. Communication and networking infrastructure of MASS shore control centres may also be
vulnerable to cyber threats
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Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
24. Non-state actors may also attack shore control centres for using MASS as a weapon against
sensitive targets
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
25. The implementation of MASS may present new challenges for maritime law enforcement
organisations (such as Coast Guard and Navy)
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
26. The adoption of MASS in shipping will significantly influence law enforcement agencies use of
Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS)
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
27. Document verification/inspection at sea onboard MASS during VBSS would require alternate
arrangements
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
28. The search operation onboard MASS (without crew) as part of VBSS will cause a challenge for
law enforcement agencies
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know
29.
Enhancement
of
maritime
security
in
MASS
Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neutral /Agree /Strongly agree / Don’t know

era

is

unavoidable
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Appendix-D
Survey Questionnaire Result
Section – I and II
1. Gender

2. Age

3. Job

4. Position
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5. Years of Experience

6. Nationality

7. How familiar are you with
the concept of Maritime
Autonomous Surface Ship
(MASS)

8. How familiar are you with
Maritime Security and its
importance
in
maritime
transport industry

79

9. How familiar are you with
the concept of law enforcement
at sea

10. Despite the absence of the
crew, traditional piracy attacks
will affect MASS.

11. MASS activities may be
more vulnerable to cyberattacks, including cyber piracy
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12. A deliberate denial of the
Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) service or the
use of misleading signals to
deceive the GNSS receiver may
be fatal for MASS

13. There are chances that nonstate actors will employ MASS
as a weapon to attack sensitive
targets (warships, port or
coastline installations etc.)

14. Autonomous (crewless)
ships, in comparison to
conventional ships, would
become a preferred choice for
criminals
to
undertake
transnational organised crimes
(arms/drugs/human
trafficking etc)
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15. The absence of crew may
encourage
criminals
to
undertake
armed
robbery/petty theft onboard
MASS

16. There is a significant
probability that stowaway will
target MASS more than
regular ships

17. There is a higher possibility
that crewless autonomous
ships may also pose a threat to
the
security
of
other
conventional ships
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18. The absence of crew
onboard MASS may weaken
the ship's security under the
ISPS code

19. Deputation of security crew
onboard MASS will be
essential to provide equivalent
level of security in ports

20. Deputation of security crew
will be essential to provide
equivalent level of security at
anchorage to avoid armed
robberies/petty thefts

83

21. Ports that would handle
MASS may have to re-evaluate
their port security assessment
under ISPS code

22. MASS security clearance
including nil stowaway must be
made compulsory prior leaving
a port

23.
Communication
and
networking infrastructure of
MASS shore control centres
may also be vulnerable to
cyber threats
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24. Non-state actors may also
attack shore control centres for
using MASS as a weapon
against sensitive targets

25. The implementation of
MASS may present new
challenges for maritime law
enforcement
organisations
(such as Coast Guard and
Navy)

26. The adoption of MASS in
shipping will significantly
influence law enforcement
agencies use of Visit Board
Search and Seizure (VBSS)
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27. Document
verification/inspection at sea
onboard MASS during VBSS
would require alternate
arrangements

28. The search operation
onboard MASS (without crew)
as part of VBSS will cause a
challenge for law enforcement
agencies

29. Enhancement of maritime
security in MASS era is
unavoidable
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